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ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CORRUPTION COMPLAINT MECHANISMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA



*This document was developed by CAPC within the Project “**Strengthening the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Mechanisms in the Republic of Moldova**”, implemented by the German Foundation for International Development through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ).*

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ABBREVIATIONS

National Administration of Penitentiaries	NAP
National Integrity Authority	NIA
Central Public Authority	CPA
Local Public Authority	LPA
National Anticorruption Centre	NAC
Administrative code	AC
Misdemeanor Code (*Contravention Code in Moldovan legislation)	MCode
Criminal Code	CCode
Central Electoral Commission	CEC
Superior Council of Magistracy	SCM
Superior Council of Prosecutors	SCP
Decision of the Constitutional Court	DCC
Government Decision	GD
Parliament Decision	PD
General Police Inspectorate	GPI
National Anti-corruption Line	NAL
Ministry of Interior	MIA
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	APO
The National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy for the years 2017-2020	NIAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study analyzes the effectiveness of the mechanisms and instruments of corruption complaint manifestations, and its objectives are:

- determining the degree of enforcement and effectiveness of corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector;
- identifying solutions for strengthening and improving the corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector.

The following corruption complaint mechanisms from the Moldova's public sector are subject of the evaluation:

- complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation;
- petition;
- disclosure of illegal practices (whistleblowing);
- reporting undue influences;
- specialized anti-corruption lines/national anti-corruption line,
- information lines;
- the reLAWed platform.

The evaluation of the mechanisms was carried out on three criteria:

- normative framework;
- the level of use by citizens of the corruption complaint mechanisms;
- the application of institutional mechanisms by public authorities in the process of examining corruption complaints.

The key findings on the effectiveness of corruption complaint mechanisms were the following:

- ***Complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation:***

The complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism is used frequently and routinely, with no access barriers, both for individuals and legal entities. In the last 5 years, a total of **2 691 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations** regarding corruption crimes or misdemeanors were submitted to the legal authorities of the Republic of Moldova, of which 1,874 were from individuals and 807 from legal entities. The majority of the complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations were filed to the NAC (1848). To the PA were submitted 454 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations, and 379 to the GPI. The number of self-denunciations increased significantly from 96 in 2018 to 177 in 2020 and 182 in 2021.

In the period 2018 – 2022 (quarter I), a total of **2 988 criminal cases** were initiated, 1073 corruption cases were submitted for examination in court and in the case of **176 corruption cases**, a **sentence was issued**. Still, integrity issues were denounced during the application of the mechanism, which were frequently generated by the abusive behaviour of the representatives of law enforcement bodies and their impunity.

- ***Petition:***

Public authorities are less open to providing information: out of 145 public authorities to whom the questionnaire was sent, **less than 1/3 (47) responded**. During 5 years, the public

authorities received a total of **240 730** petitions. Annually, on average, 9-10 CPAs and 3 LPAs of those who responded to the questionnaire, do not receive any petitions.

In the period of 2018-2022 (quarter I), the citizens of the Republic of Moldova addressed a total of **3 665 petitions to the CPA on corruption subjects** and none to the local public authorities. Most of the petitions regarding the subjects of corruption were addressed to NIA, law enforcement bodies (National Authority of Penitentiaries/NAP, MIA, GPI) and CEC (voters' corruption).

The public authorities (excepting NIA, NAP, MIA, GPI and CEC) do not keep separate records of petitions on corruption.

- ***Disclosure of illegal practices (whistleblowing):***

The mechanism of whistleblowing is not fully used and applied in the Republic of Moldova by both employers and employees. The related regulatory framework was updated in 2018, but the adoption of subsequent acts was delayed.

In the period of 2018-2022 (quarter I) **4 whistleblowing disclosures** were registered and examined.

The systemic problems for an effective functioning of the whistleblowing mechanism are:

- the lack of an umbrella institution to monitor and guide public entities and agents during the application of the mechanism;
- the continued lack of knowledge by public sector agents, employees of the whistleblowing mechanism, despite the conducted trainings and information campaigns;
- the formal approach of the entities within the mechanism implementation;
- fragile safeguards;
- almost non-existent or questionable judicial practice, etc.

- ***Reporting undue influences:***

The regulatory framework for reporting undue influence is of a suitable quality and allows users to make use of the tools provided by both the framework laws and the subsequent rules, including the internal documents of the public authorities.

39 complaints were registered of undue influences within **13 public entities**.

The use of the mechanism by public agents is not a common practice, this being generated by: ignorance of the obligation to report undue influences; the reluctance regarding the finality of the undue influence complaint examination; fear.

- ***Specialized anti-corruption lines/national anti-corruption line:***

The regulation on the functioning of the anti-corruption telephone line system, approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013, defines the mechanism for the establishment and operation of telephone lines, as well as the authorities responsible for managing these lines, establishes the

obligation of public entities to establish Registers of records of calls and designate subdivisions/persons responsible for handling them.

In the period 2018-2022, NAC received **11 567 calls** at the national anti-corruption line, and within public entities, which have a specialized anti-corruption line, approximately 7 618 calls were registered.

Although public authorities qualify the anti-corruption hotline mechanism as effective, most do not record calls, cannot provide information on their effectiveness, and do not ensure an independent and confidential review of reports.

- ***Information lines:***

Institutional information lines are of great importance in the citizen's interaction with public entities and represent an important tool for ensuring institutional transparency. The vast majority of public authorities (77%) reported the existence of institutional information lines.

The institutional information lines are intensively requested, so that in the period 2018-2022, approximately **1 301 094 calls** were registered. However, this number of calls cannot be an indication of a good functioning of the mechanism, because the statistics presented by the authorities also include appointments and specialized consultations.

The activity of operators and the responsible persons for managing the information lines is not monitored and/or subject to quality control.

Regarding the **ranking of complaint mechanisms** regarding corruption, it was certified that none of the mechanisms obtained the maximum possible score of **6 points**:

- 2 mechanisms: the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation and the National Anti-corruption Line scored 5 points;
- 3 mechanisms: undue influences reporting, specialized anti-corruption lines and information lines were evaluated with 4 points;
- 2 mechanisms: petitions and whistleblowing disclosures only accumulated 3 points in the assessment exercise.

The majority of the mechanisms (6) were de-scored for the criterion that assessed the degree of their use by citizens (or public agents), and the maximum score was given mainly for the criterion of quality of the normative framework.

The recommendations were included in chapter V of the Study, and a series of actions to raise the efficiency of the mechanisms and increase their credibility.

I. PRELIMINARIES

Reducing the corruption phenomenon and its consequences is a constant challenge for the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. Over time, a number of means and tools have been developed and implemented to report corruption/corruption manifestations in order to promptly detect and respond quickly to the cessation of such actions. Despite these normative as well as practical efforts, we acknowledge modest developments in terms of reporting corruption, implicitly preventing and combating the phenomenon as a whole.

According to a [recent Study](#)¹, the population and business continue to be reluctant in reporting the corruption acts they face while interacting with public agents (public servant - a person employed in a public entity and who holds a public office, a public office with special status, a public dignity position, is employed in the office of a person with public dignity position or provides services of public interest, as well as the locally elected). Thus, **almost 4 out of 5 respondents did not report corruption acts** which they have faced in the last 12 months. According to the same report, the main reasons why the population and economic agents do not report the corruption acts they have faced in the interaction with public agents rely on the belief that this is useless (48% population and 60% business), the belief that there are no protection mechanisms for those who report corruption acts (27% population and 34% business) and the fear of not suffering later personally or professionally (26% population and 40% business). On the other hand, almost 1 in 5 respondents (population and business) do not report corruption cases, because they had personal benefits from these cases/interactions with public agencies.

In view of the above, it was considered appropriate to initiate a comprehensive evaluation exercise of the reliability and effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for complaining/reporting corruption, if these are sufficient and safe, or excessive and inappropriate.

The present **Study on the effectiveness of the corruption complaint mechanisms from the public sector from Moldova** (*Study on the use of the corruption complaint mechanisms in Moldova*) was developed within the project "**Strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms in the Republic of Moldova**", implemented by the German Foundation for Development through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ).

The study analyzes the effectiveness of the mechanisms and instruments of corruption complaint manifestations, and its objectives are:

- determining the degree of enforcement and effectiveness of corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector;
- identifying solutions for strengthening and improving the corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector.

The present document was preceded by a **Mapping Report** which integrated the results of the identification and analysis of the mechanisms for complaining/reporting the corruption

¹ Study on the impact assessment of the National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy - Moldova 2021, pag.75, <https://bit.ly/3DdSoKx>

manifestations in the Republic of Moldova and applied by the public authorities. Mapping activities established the existence of:

A. 6 formal corruption complaint mechanisms², as follows:

- complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation;
- petition;
- disclosure of illegal practices (whistleblowing);
- reporting undue influence;
- specialized anti-corruption lines;
- information lines.

B. at least 3 informal corruption complaint mechanisms³:

- public complaints;
- feedback platforms on the web pages of public authorities (subsequently reviewed by the authorities through the petition mechanism);
- the online notification platform on the NAC web-page.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the corruption complaint mechanisms was carried out on the basis of a Methodology, specially developed by the CAPC team, the methodological benchmarks being presented in Chapter II of this Study.

The study analyzes the effectiveness of each complaint mechanism separately and provides a ranking of these mechanisms, emerging from the pre-established Evaluation Grid. At the same time, the Study includes a set of recommendations that are addressed to the public authorities responsible for managing these mechanisms and whose objective is to increase the efficiency of the corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector in the Republic of Moldova.

² Mechanisms expressly established by the national normative framework and applied by the public authorities of the Republic of Moldova

³ Mechanisms that are not necessarily established by the normative acts and are not binding for public authorities. Informal mechanisms, as a rule, are the voluntary will of public authorities, which proactively develop and apply new ways of reporting irregularities, including potentially corrupt ones, involving the application of modern communication tools (applications or web platforms, mobile applications, etc.).

II. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used by the authors of this Study took into account the results of the preliminary activity of mapping the corruption complaint mechanisms, the specifics of each mechanism, as well as the specifics of the authorities responsible for managing corruption complaint mechanisms.

The purpose of the evaluation is to analyze the effectiveness of the corruption complaint mechanisms and tools from the public sector, to assess their level, accessibility and enforcement, and to develop recommendations for the improvement of the regulatory framework and practices in the public sector.

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- determining the use, enforcement and effectiveness of the corruption complaint mechanisms from the public sector;
- identifying solutions for strengthening and improving the corruption complaints mechanisms from the public sector.

Subjects of assessment

The sample of subjects for the evaluation was determined based on the normative provisions, which provide the mandatory application character of the complaint mechanisms by the public authorities. Therefore, 4 categories of public entities were questioned:

- 13 ministries (specialized central administrative authorities);
- 18 autonomous administrative authorities;
- 11 central administrative authorities;
- 33 administrative authorities subordinated to the ministries;
- 70 local public administration authorities (local councils and city/municipalities).

The list of authorities questioned in the evaluation exercise is presented in Annex no. 1 of this Study.

Evaluation period

The period subject to evaluation covers the years 2018-2022 (Q1) for formal corruption complaint mechanisms.

The system of indicators

The evaluation was carried out on three criteria:

- normative framework;
- the level of use by citizens of the corruption complaint mechanisms;
- the application of institutional mechanisms by public authorities in the process of examining corruption complaints.

Sources for obtaining/verifying indicators

The following sources were used within the evaluation process:

a. Official information provided by the subjects subject to the assessment in the survey process. By using the *Google Forms* online survey tool **8 questionnaires** were configured regarding the following complaint mechanisms:

- Whistleblowing disclosures;
- Undue influences;
- Information lines;
- National Anti-corruption Lines;
- Specialized anti-corruption lines;
- Petitions;
- Complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation (*Google Excel Sheet*);
- The reLAWed platform.

The questionnaires allowed the real-time collection of the information/answers and data needed to analyze the effectiveness of the complaint mechanisms currently managed by the public authorities. The questions from the questionnaires focused on the existence of the internal infrastructure for the application of the mechanisms, the request for statistical data obtained as a result of the application of the mechanisms. The public authorities were requested to assess the efficiency of the mechanisms, as well as to offer, as appropriate, recommendations and solutions for their efficiency. It should be noted that not all authorities answered to the request for filling in the questionnaires, some ignored or selectively completed only a part of the required data. Data on the number and category of authorities that completed the questionnaires are contained in the analysis of each mechanism in the chapter III of this Study.

b. Official national sources: reports (analytical notes) on the application and results of corruption reporting mechanisms; press releases; reports on the implementation of relevant policy documents;

c. Data corresponding/relevant to the corruption reporting mechanism from the [Impact Assessment Study of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy – Moldova 2021](#), including the analysis compared to the data of previous similar studies;

d. National media: relevant web portals; journalistic investigative articles (www.moldovacurata.md; www.anticoruptie.md);

e. National civil society: research carried out by national non-governmental organizations, relevant to the purpose of the evaluation.

3 focus groups were organized to verify the application of the corruption complaint mechanisms. Depending on the specifics of the complaint mechanism and in order to capture various opinions in the focus groups, lawyers were invited (the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism and the petition), representatives of civil society, public authorities and lawyers (the mechanisms of whistleblowers, reporting undue influences and specialized and information lines).

In assigning the scores for each complaint mechanism, the following evaluation grid was used:

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	0	There is no regulatory framework that would regulate the application of the reporting mechanism
	1	Although there is a higher normative framework, it is not developed by subordinated normative acts Although there is a regulatory framework, it is not of the right quality
	2	There is a normative framework that regulates the application of the complaint mechanism, which is of a suitable quality.
Analysis and evaluation of the level of use of the complaints mechanisms by citizens	0	The mechanism is not used and/or is not applied
	1	The mechanism is partially used
	2	The mechanism is frequently used and there are no access difficulties
Analysis and evaluation of the level of application of the institutional mechanisms for examining corruption complaints	0	The mechanism is not institutionalized and/or not implemented
	1	The mechanism is partially applied
	2	The mechanism is applied consistently and routinely, with the issuance of decisions/solutions/sanctions

The study integrates and analyzes all the data collected, by using the assessment tools mentioned above, and summarizes the basic findings, according to the structure established by the Methodology.

III. EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION COMPLAINT MECHANISMS

This chapter provides an analysis of the effectiveness of each corruption complaint mechanism based on the criteria, tools and evaluation grid established by the Methodology.

III.1. COMPLAINT/DENUNCIATION/SELF-DENUNCIATION

a. Regulation

The complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation are classic formal mechanisms for the notification of the public authorities about a crime. These forms of notification of the criminal investigation body appeared and evolved together with the criminal law.

Complaint is the notification made by a natural or legal person who has been harmed by a crime (par. (1) art. 263 of the Criminal Code). The complaint can also be made by one of the spouses for the other spouse or by the adult child for the parents.

Denunciation is the notification made by a natural or legal person about a crime (par. (2) art. 263 of the Criminal Code).

Self-denunciation is the voluntary notification made by a natural or legal person about the commission of a crime by him-self, in the event that the criminal investigation bodies are not aware of this fact (par. (1) art. 264 of the Criminal Code).

The criminal investigation body is obliged to receive the complaints or denunciations regarding crimes committed, prepared or in the process of being prepared, even if the case is not within its jurisdiction. The person who filed the complaint or denunciation is immediately issued a certificate about this fact, indicating the person who received the complaint or denunciation and the time when it was registered. The refusal of the criminal investigation body to receive the complaint or denunciation can be appealed.

Anonymous complaints and denunciations cannot serve as a basis for starting a criminal investigation, however, following the control carried out based on these complaints or denunciations, the criminal investigation body can self-denunciation for criminal prosecution.

The regulatory framework	Criminal Procedure Code: art. 263-265 Criminal code: art.440
Beneficiaries/users	Any natural or legal person
Scope (public/private/general)	The denunciation/complaint mechanism has a general character and can be used by any interested person
Grievance / complaint methods	Competent authorities: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Anti-corruption Prosecutor's Office• National Anti-corruption Centre• General Police Inspectorate• State Fiscal Service (for forgery in accounting documents, art. 335 ¹ Criminal Code)

	<p>The complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation must include: the name, first name, quality and domicile of the petitioner, description of the deed that is object of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation, the perpetrator, if he is known, and the proofs.</p> <p>The method of leveraging the mechanisms:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in writing: by post; physically at the headquarters of the public authority; by e-mail with the application of an electronic or mobile signature. • orally: the notification made is recorded in minutes signed by the person who declares the complaint or denunciation and by the official person of the criminal investigation body. The self-declaration statement is additionally audio or video recorded.
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b. Analysis and evaluation of the normative framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	<p>The CPC was adopted on 14.03.2003 and regulates the criminal process in the Republic of Moldova, which represents the activity of the criminal investigation bodies and the courts with the participation of the parties in the process and other persons and which is considered to have started from the moment of notification or self-notification to the competent body about the preparation or committing a crime.</p> <p>Since its adoption, the CPC has been amended/supplemented in a total of 83 times: in 2006 - 12 times; in 2018 9 times; in 2020 8 times; in 2007, 2012 and 2017 - 7 times; in 2006 and 2008 - 6 times; in 2011 - 5 times; in 2005 and 2013 - 4 times; in 2015 - 3 times; in 2014 twice and once each in 2009, 2010 and 2021.</p> <p>Certain provisions of the CPC were declared unconstitutional by: CCD no. 15 of 28.05.2020; CCD no. 2 of 23.01.2020; CCD no. 27 of 30.10.2018; CCD no. 19 of 03.07.2018; CCD no. 17 of 19.05.2016; CCD no. 3 of 23.02.2016.</p> <p>The MC was adopted on 24.10.2008 and includes the legal norms that establish the general and special principles and provisions in misdemeanor matters, determine the facts that constitute misdemeanors, regulate the misdemeanor process and misdemeanor sanctions.</p> <p>Since its adoption, the MC has been amended/supplemented, in total, 197 times: in 2016, 26 times; 2012 and 2018 - 22 times; in 2020 - 19 times; in 2013 - 18 times; in 2011 - 17 times; in 2017 - 15 times; in 2014 - 13 times; in 2015 - 12 times; in 2021 - 10 times; in 2010 - 9 times; in 2019 - 8 times; in 2009 - 2 times, and in 2022, on June 1, MC was already modified/completed 4 times.</p> <p>Certain provisions of the MC were declared unconstitutional by: CCD no. 18 of 30.06.2020; CCD no. 32 of 29.11.2018; CCD no. 7 of 26.04.2018; CCD no. 11 of 08.05.2018; CCD no. 10 of 10.05.2016; CCD no. 12 of 04.06.2013.</p> <p>In the part related to "Notifying the criminal investigation body" (Chapter II, Title I, Special Part, CPC) and "Finding the misdemeanor" (Chapter VI, Title II, Special Part, MC), the legal norms, in general, are consistent with the criteria of clarity and predictability, being concise and comprehensive. The opportunity and applicability of the CPC and MC provisions has been tested over time, the legal</p>
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	norms being adjusted, through amendments/supplements or CCD, depending on the needs.
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones	<p>The additional aspects, related to denunciation to the criminal prosecution body, regulated by the CPC and CC, are developed through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law no. 1545-XIII of 25.02.98 on compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecutor's office and the courts; • Law no. 1104-XV of 06.06.2002 on the National Anti-corruption Centre; • Law no. 333-XVI of 10.11.2006 on the status of the criminal investigation officer; • Government Decision no. 824 of 23.07.2007 approving the Concept of the Automated Information System "Register of Law Enforcement Infrastructure"; • Law no. 198-XVI of 26.07.2007 on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid; • Law no. 105-XVI of 16.05.2008 on the protection of witnesses and other participants in criminal proceedings; • Law no. 59 of 29.03.2012 on special investigative activity; • Law no. 320 of 27.12.2012 on police activity and policeman status; • Law no. 3 of 25.02.2016 on the Prosecutor's Office; • Law no. 159 of 07.07.2016 on specialized prosecutor's offices; • Order of the General Prosecutor no. 24/28 of 24.09.2016 approving the Prosecutor's Office Regulation.
The quality of the subordinated normative framework	The normative acts that develop the provisions of the CPC and MC meet the requirements of the regulatory limits, respect the deadlines imposed by the CPC and CC. In general, are consistent with the criteria of clarity and predictability, being concise and comprehensive.
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	In general, the CPC and MC provisions comply with the international standards in the field, international assessment tools.
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	Although the part related to "Notification of the criminal investigation body" (Chapter II, Title I, Special Part, CPC) and "Finding the misdemeanor" (Chapter VI, Title II, Special Part, CC), in general, is not affected by vulnerability factors of legal norms, however, considering the frequency of changes and the nature of the matter regulated by the CPC and CC, we admit that it is possible to promote some legislative changes, which would allow: ambiguous language formulations; excessive discretion in application; limited access to information and lack of transparency; lack/insufficiency of control mechanisms.

c. Analysis and assessment of the complaint/ denunciation/ self-denunciation mechanism level of use by citizens

The analysis and evaluation of the level of use by citizens of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism is presented separately, for each way of reporting to the criminal investigation bodies.

Complaint

According to the information collected from the public authorities, during the last 5 years, the complaint **mechanism** was used by **894 natural persons** and **61 legal persons**, when they had the need to notify the responsible authorities about a damage caused to them via crimes or misdemeanors related to corruption acts.




Figure 1: The number of complaints filed regarding corruption crimes and misdemeanors in the period 2018 – 1st quarter 2022

In Figure 1 we notice that the number of complaints decreased during 2020-2021. Shall be assumed that this decrease reflects the period of the pandemic, in which direct social communication was limited.

During the last 5 years, the majority of the complaints on the damage of corruption offenses were addressed to the specialized anti-corruption authorities: NAC (366 complaints) and PA (298 complaints). Also, 154 complaints were addressed to the GPI. Shall be noted that during the pandemic years (2020-2021), the number of complaints addressed to GPI were almost equal (2020) or even higher (2021) than that of complaints addressed to specialized anti-corruption authorities.

The authority to which the crime complaint was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	70	4	76	10	78	4	34	6	13	3
National Anti-corruption Centre	133	10	105	1	39	5	56	6	10	1

General Police Inspectorate	19	2	11	0	34	0	63	6	16	3
TOTAL	222	16	192	11	151	9	153	18	39	7
	238		203		160		171		46	

Figure 2: Number of complaints on damage caused by corruption offenses vs. notified authorities

The damage **complaints** referred to the following crimes:

- passive corruption, art. 324 of the Criminal Code (54 to APO, 65 to NAC and 17 to GPI);
- active corruption, art. 325 of the Criminal Code (3 to APO, 19 to NAC and 18 to GPI);
- influence peddling, art. 326 CC (43 to APO and 118 to NAC);
- abuse of power or abuse of official position, art. 327 CC (117 to APO, 88 to NAC and 67 to GPI);
- excess of power or excess of official authority, art. 328 CC (68 to the APO and 40 to the NAC);
- negligent performance of duties, art. 329 CC (2 to PA, 20 to NAC and 8 to GPI);
- forgery of public documents, art. 332 CC (16 to the NAC and 38 to the GPI);
- fraudulent possession of means from external funds, art. 332¹ CC (2 to the APO).

Therewith, were filed 137 complaints on damage caused by corruption offenses, of which 120 to the NAC and 17 to the APO. The legal entities have not filed any complaint of causing damages through corruption offences.

The authority to which the misdemeanor complaint was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	7	0	3	0	3	0	3	0	1	0
National Anticorruption Centre	14	0	31	0	31	0	28	0	16	0
TOTAL	21	0	34	0	34	0	31	0	17	0
	21		34		34		31		17	

Figure 3: Number of complaints of damage caused by misdemeanors vs. notified authorities

The damage **complaints** referred to the following misdemeanors:

- abuse of power or abuse of office, art. 312 MC (7 to APO and 19 to NAC);
- excess of power or exceeding of duties, art. 313 MC (8 to APO and 86 to NAC);
- protectionism, art. 313¹ MC (3 to NAC);
- non-declaration or non-resolution of the conflict of interests, art. 313² MC, (2 to NAC);
- receiving illegitimate reward or material benefit, art. 315 MC (2 to APO and 10 to NAC)

Denouncement

The denunciation mechanism (the notification made by a natural or legal person about the commission of a crime or misdemeanor), during the last 5 years, was used by a total of **1 182 people**, of which 819 natural persons and 363 legal persons.




Figure 4: The number of complaints filed regarding corruption crimes and misdemeanors in the period 2018 - 1st quarter 2022

As for corruption crimes, the majority of the complaints (807) were submitted to the NAC , followed by the GPI with 222 complaints received and the APO with 120 complaints.

The authority to which the crime complaint was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	34	11	29	9	6	4	17	4	4	2
National Anticorruption Centre	116	71	90	93	208	4	179	10	29	7
General Police Inspectorate	32	0	28	0	18	0	18	108	3	15
TOTAL	182	82	147	102	232	8	214	122	36	24
	264		249		240		336		60	

Figure 5: Number of denunciations on corruption offenses vs. notified authorities

The denunciations referred to the following **crimes**:

- passive corruption, art. 324 of the CC (32 to the PA, 162 to the NAC and 12 to the GPI);
- active corruption, art. 325 of the CC (11 to PA, 68 to NAC and 33 to GPI);
- influence peddling, art. 326 CC (20 to PA, 294 to NAC and 1 to GPI);
- exercise of duties in the public sector in a situation of conflict of interests, art. 326 ¹ CC (1 to PA);
- abuse of power or abuse of official position, art. 327 CC (32 to PA, 110 to NAC and 52 to GPI);
- excess of power or excess of official authority, art. 328 of the CC (15 to the APO and 87 to the NAC);
- negligent performance of duties, art. 329 CC (2 to PA, 43 to NAC and 7 to GPI);
- illicit enrichment, art. 330² CC (5 to the APO and 3 to the NAC)
- forgery in public documents, art. 332 of the CC (2 to the PA, 40 to the NAC and 117 to the GPI).

At the same time, during the last 5 years, 8 complaints were submitted to the APO and 25 to the NAC about corruption misdemeanors.

The authority to which the denunciation of the commission of the misdemeanor was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	4	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
National Anticorruption Centre	0	6	0	2	0	12	0	4	0	1
TOTAL	4	6	2	2	1	12	1	4	0	1
	10		4		13		5		1	

Figure 6: Number of denunciations on corruption offenses vs. notified authorities

The **denouncements** referred to the following misdemeanors:

- abuse of power or abuse of office, art. 312 MC (2 to APO and 3 to NAC);
- excess of power or exceeding of duties, art. 313 MC (4 to APO and 22 to NAC);
- receiving illegal reward or financial benefit, art. 315 MC (2 to PA).

Self-denounce

According to the public authorities, during the last 5 years, a total of **544 people**, of which 161 natural persons and 383 legal persons, have voluntarily notified the criminal investigation bodies about a corruption crime or misdemeanor committed by them-selves.




Figure 7: Number of self-denunciations filed regarding corruption crimes and misdemeanors, in the period 2018 - 2022 (I quarter)

As for corruption crimes, the majority of self-denunciations were received by the NAC (485). 11 self-denunciations were received by the APO and 3 by the GPI. Shall be noted that self-denunciation is the "preferred" mechanism by legal entities for notifying public authorities about the commission of corruption crimes: 338 self-denunciations made by legal entities compared to 161 self-denunciations made by natural persons.

The authority to which the self-denunciation about the crime was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
1. Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office	3	2	3	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
2. National Anticorruption Centre	41	48	0	29	53	107	50	109	5	43
3. General Police Inspectorate	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
TOTAL	45	50	3	29	54	107	54	109	5	43
	95		32		161		163		48	

Figure 8: The number of self-denunciations regarding the corruption offenses vs. notified authorities

The **self-denunciations** have referred to the following crimes:

- passive corruption, art. 324 of the CC (4 to the PA, 85 to the NAC and 1 to the GPI);
- active corruption, art. 325 CC (2 to PA, 60 to NAC and 2 to GPI);
- influence peddling, art. 326 CC (3 to APO and 108 to NAC);
- exercise of duties in the public sector in a situation of conflict of interest, art. 326¹ of the CC (4 to NAC);
- abuse of power or abuse of official position, art. 327 CC (1 to APO and 74 to NAC);
- excess of power or excess of official authority, art. 328 of the CC (26 to the NAC);
- negligent performance of duties, art. 329 of the CC (2 to the APO and 52 to the NAC)
- forgery in public documents, art. 332 of the CC (75 to the NAC).

As far as corruption offenses are concerned, 45 self-denunciations were filed only by legal entities and only to the NAC.

The authority to which the self-denunciation about the misdemeanor was addressed	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022, quarter I	
	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.	natural pers.	legal pers.
National Anticorruption Centre	0	1	0	9	0	16	0	19	0	0

Figure 9: Number of self-denunciations regarding corruption offenses vs. notified authorities

Self-denunciations referred to the commission of the following misdemeanors:

- abuse of power or abuse of official position, art. 312 MC (19 to NAC);
- excess of power or excess of official authority, art. 313 MC (26 to NAC).

At the same time, within the focus group on the use of the complaint/ denunciation/ self-denunciation mechanism, it was mentioned that:

- *“In practice, the denunciation is often used as a means of resolving/revenge in cases of people in conflict or litigating. If one of the parties has acquaintances in the prosecution or NAC, then they make allegations to tease or extort money from the other party. There may be situations where one of the parties is looking for a prosecutor or employee of the NAC, namely to ensure that if a complaint is filed, the prosecutor/NAC employee will exercise the respective pressure, through the existing criminal instruments.”*
- *“The denouncements are filed, if it is in the interest of the examiner.”*
- *“We have had situations where the filing of the complaint was used to transfer the criminal file from one prosecutor to another. This was done to achieve personal goals.”*
- *“We have witnessed situations in which politicians make public reports. These people (politicians) will not have any procedural status! We don't know if the law enforcement agencies have reacted.”*
- *“The self-denunciation is usually applied at the “suggestion” of prosecutors or NAC employees in order to free themselves from liability, when the investigation starts and to ensure statistics and/or ease the work of the respective law enforcement bodies. Self-denunciation can also be a tool to start a criminal case against a certain person.”*

d. Analysis and efficiency of the application of the complaint/denunciation/self - denunciation mechanism by the public authorities

According to paragraph (1) of art. 262 CPC, the criminal prosecution body can be notified about committing or preparing for committing a crime according to for by the [Criminal Code](#) through: a complaint; a denounce; a self-denunciation; a crime report, drafted by the detection bodies as described in art. 273 paragraph (1) of the CPC; the direct detection by the criminal investigation body or prosecutor of the reasonable suspicion about committing a crime and the audit report of the Court of Accounts.

Respectively, the statistical data described below reflects the information about all means of notification of the criminal investigation body, and not only those regarding the complaint, denunciation and self-denunciation.

The efficiency of the application of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism by the APO, NAC and GPI was measured by comparing the total number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations addressed to public authorities with the total number of criminal cases opened.

In the period of 2018 – 2022 (quarter I), the APO started in total **597 criminal cases**, 190 of these were sent for examination in court and in the case of 176 corruption cases, a criminal sentence was issued. During this period, the APO received 429 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes. Taking into account the fact that the total number of criminal cases initiated by the APO in the last 5 years is higher than the number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes, submitted by natural persons/legal entities, we shall conclude that the mechanism is customary applied, with the issuance of decisions / solutions / sanctions.




Figure 10: Number of criminal cases started (DPP), sent to the court (DTIJ) by the APO and in which there is a criminal sentence (SP)

The criminal cases initiated (DPP) by the APO, submitted to the court (DTIJ) and in which a criminal sentence (SP) was issued were referring to the following crimes:

- passive corruption (art. 324 CC) – 188 DPP, 37 DTIJ and 54 SP;

- active corruption (art. 325 CC) – 62 DPP, 23 DTIJ and 16 SP;
- influence peddling (art. 326 CC) – 109 DPP, 87 DTIJ and 68 SP;
- abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 126 DPP, 13 DTIJ and 14 SP;
- excess of power or excess of official authority (art. 328 of the CC) – 39 DPP, 12 DTIJ and 10 SP;
- negligent performance of duties (art. 329 CC) – 9 DPP, 6 DTIJ and 6 SP;
- illicit enrichment (art. 330² CC) – 43 DPP, 5 DTIJ and 1 SP;
- forgery in public documents (art. 332 CC) – 21 DPP, 7 DTIJ and 7 SP.

During the last 5 years, NAC initiated in total **2 078 criminal cases** and submitted 853 corruption cases for examination in court. During this period NAC received 1658 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes. Taking into account the total number of criminal cases initiated by the NAC in the last 5 years in relation to the number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes, submitted by individuals/legal entities to the NAC, we conclude that the mechanism within the NAC is consistently and routinely applied, with issuing decisions/solutions/sanctions.




Figure 11: Number of criminal cases started (DPP) and sent to the court (DTIJ) by the NAC

The criminal cases initiated (DPP) by the NAC and submitted to the court (DTIJ) were referring to the following crimes:

- passive corruption (art. 324 of the CC) – 627 DPP and 119 DTIJ;
- active corruption (art. 325 CC) – 330 DPP and 212 DTIJ;
- influence peddling (art. 326 CC) – 672 DPP and 351 DTIJ;
- exercise of duties in the public sector in a situation of conflict of interests (art. 326¹ CC) – 4 DPP and 1 DTIJ;
- abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 180 DPP and 73 DTIJ; e
- excess of power or excess of official authority (art. 328 CC) – 94 DPP and 19 DTIJ;
- negligent performance of duties (art. 329 CC) – 27 DPP and 7 DTIJ;

- violation of the confidentiality regime of information from wealth and personal interests declarations (art. 330¹ CC) – 1 DPP;
- illicit enrichment (art. 330² CC) – 15 DPP;
- forgery in public documents (art. 332 CC) – 127 DPP and 71 DTIJ;
- embezzlement of funds from external funds (art. 332² CC) – 1 DPP.

The GPI initiated **313 criminal cases** in total and submitted 30 corruption cases for examination in court. During this period, the GPI received 394 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes. Taking into account the fact that the total number of criminal cases initiated by the GPI in the last 5 years is higher than the number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes, submitted by natural persons/legal entities, we conclude that the mechanism is usually applied, with the issuance of decisions/solutions/sanctions.




Figure 12: Number of criminal cases started (DPP) and sent to court (DTIJ) by the GPI

The criminal cases initiated (DPP) by the GPI and sent to the court (DTIJ) referred to the following crimes:

- passive corruption (art. 324 CC) – 71 DPP and 3 DTIJ;
- active corruption (art. 325 CC) – 74 DPP and 19 DTIJ;
- influence peddling (art. 326 CC) – 17 DPP and 1 DTIJ;
- abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 71 DPP and 4 DTIJ;
- excess of power or excess of official authority (art. 328 CC) – 25 DPP and 1 DTIJ;
- negligent performance of duties (art. 329 of the CC) – 10 DPP;
- violation of the confidentiality regime of information from wealth and personal interests declarations (art. 330¹ CC) – 1 DPP;
- forgery in public documents (art. 332 CC) – 41 DPP and 2 DTIJ;
- fraudulent obtaining of funds from external funds (art. 332¹ CC) – 3 DPP.

During the focus group on the authorities' efficiency in the application of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism, there was mentioned:

- *"There is a hyper-criminalization in our legal system, both from the perspective of legal norms and the operation mode of the law enforcement bodies. as an example are the smuggling or fraud. The vast majority of fraud criminal cases, in fact, are not crimes. The prosecutors initiate these files, following an agreement with one of the parties. We had a situation in which there was a court decision in a civil case, issued by the Romanian courts (1st instance, appeal and recourse), in which it was expressly indicated that it was a loan contract, and our legal bodies initiated a criminal file on fraud (art. 190 CC). And in order for such a file to end up being instrumented by certain legal bodies, in addition, a file is filed for money laundering (art. 243 of the Criminal Code)."*
- *"It is necessary to decriminalize some crime components. Has anyone in Moldova calculated how much it costs to roll a criminal case? What is the purpose? What does the state gain? How many damages/expenses were recovered? Fiscal criminal files - who needs them? NAC cooperates with their lawyers and extort money from businessmen! A situation: masked men came to the office of a businessman. His reaction - "Television is here? No. Then it's a deal! 20 thousand and the problem is solved."*
- *"A big problem is the quality of the prosecutors. They manipulate statistical data and generally have a criminal mentality. They act like "gopniks" - antisocial criminals. We have "gopnic prosecutors". A prosecutor with a criminal record, suspended from office, in a discussion said: "I want to re-establish myself in the prosecutor's office, because I have filled myself with debts!"*
- *"There were cases in which a person was in preventive detention for 1 year, without evidence. The prosecutor failed to verify an information and no one was held responsible for the illegal deprivation of liberty for 1 year, because the statute of limitations for prosecution had expired."*
- *"The institution of the investigating judge is not that „не состоялся, даже не родился!". As it was written in a report, the judges have become mere notaries of the prosecutors."*

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	2	The normative framework that regulates the application of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism is of a suitable quality.
Analysis and assessment of the level of use of the complaint mechanism by citizens	2	The complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism is used frequently and routinely, without access difficulties, both by individuals and legal entities.
Analysis and evaluation of the level of application of institutional mechanisms for examining complaints/notifications about corruption	1	The mechanism is partially applied. Although the authorities apply the usual mechanism, with the issuance of decisions/solutions/sanctions, however, there are integrity problems at the level of application of the mechanism.

III.2. PETITION

a. Regulation

The petition is one of the classic mechanisms for citizens' interaction with the public authorities, which was regulated by Law no. 190-XIII of 19.07.94 on petitioning and the Administrative Litigation Law, no. 793-XIV of 10.02.2000. With the entry into force, on 01.04.2019, of Administrative Code no. 116 of 19.07.2018, both laws were repealed.

The administrative code systematized all the regulations regarding the administrative procedure, carried out by the public authorities by incorporating the rules, legal institutions specific to the administrative procedure and those specific to the administrative litigation in a single legislative act. It regulates in an exhaustive manner the principles, concepts, stages of the administrative procedure, appeals and the legal regime of administrative acts, operations and contracts in order to protect the fundamental rights of individuals and increase the degree of security of administrative legal relations.

The normative framework	Administrative code
Beneficiaries/users	Any natural or legal person
Scope (public/private/general)	The petition mechanism is general and can be used by any interested person
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>Competent authorities: any public authority</p> <p>For the purposes of the Administrative Code, a <i>petition</i> is any <i>request</i>, <i>notification</i> or <i>proposal</i> addressed to a public authority by a natural or legal person.</p> <p>The <i>request</i> requires the issuance of an individual administrative act or the performance of an administrative operation.</p> <p>By <i>notification</i> the public authority is informed about a matter of personal or public interest.</p> <p>The <i>proposal</i> aims to lead to conducting public interest actions by the public authority.</p> <p>Communication with the participants or the public in the administrative procedure is done by any means (verbal, mail, telephone, fax, e-mail, etc.), giving priority to the means that ensure greater efficiency, speed and cost savings, in particular electronic means of communication (art. 33 Administrative Code).</p>

b. Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	<p>The Administrative Code was adopted on 19.07.2018 and represents the main legal framework, which ensures the regulation of administrative relations when performing administrative activity and judicial control over it.</p> <p>Since its adoption, the CA has been amended/supplemented 3 times, during 2021.</p>
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	<p>At the same time, art. 225 para. (3) of the AC in the part where it limits the competence of the courts to carry out the control of the proportionality of the measures ordered by the public authority and of the individual administrative and normative acts was declared unconstitutional by CCD no. 17 of 23.06.2020 and, respectively, CCD no. 27 of 13.11.2020.</p> <p>In general, the provisions of the CA are consistent with the criteria of clarity and predictability, they are concise and comprehensive, being timely and applicable.</p>
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones	<p>The regulatory framework for AC implementation is underdeveloped. The following subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones, were identified: Government Decision no. 463 of 02.10.2019 regarding the organization of the hearing and Order of the State Fiscal Service no. 93 of 01.03.2019 regarding the approval of the Regulation regarding the submission and reception of petitions within State Fiscal Service</p> <p>Herewith, shall be noted that the Government Decision no. 208 of 31.03.95 is in force for the approval of the Instructions regarding the secretarial work and the petitions of natural and legal persons, addressed to state bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Republic of Moldova, which was approved for the execution of Law no. 190-XIII of 19.07.94 on petition (repealed by the adoption of the AC).</p>
The quality of the subordinate normative framework	<p>The normative acts, which implement the AC, correspond to the requirements of the regulatory limits, respect the deadlines imposed by the AC, in general, are consistent with the criteria of clarity and predictability, having a concise and partly comprehensive character (for example, the State Fiscal Service Order of no. 93 of 01.03.2019 does not make a clear differentiation between notification, requests/application and proposals)</p>
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	<p>In general, the provisions of the AC are in accordance with international standards in the field, international evaluation instruments.</p>
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	<p>In general, AC is not affected by legal vulnerability factors. During the focus group, it was stated that there would be a draft law, through which consistent amendments/supplements to the AC are promoted. Considering the nature of the matter regulated by the AC, we admit that it is possible that they contain: ambiguous language formulations; excessive discretion in application; limited access to information and lack of transparency; lack/insufficiency of control mechanisms.</p>

c. Analysis and assessment of the petition mechanism level of use by citizens

In order to analyze and evaluate the level of use of the petition mechanism by citizens, CAPC developed a questionnaire, addressed to public authorities. It mainly concerned the following subjects: the existence in the premises of the institution of boxes for collecting petitions; the existence of a functional online tool for petitions; the total number of notifications, requests, proposals received from citizens during the last 5 years; the number of notifications, requests, proposals on corruption-related topics, received from citizens during the last 5 years.

The questionnaire was sent to 145 central and local public authorities. CAPC received responses from 35 CPAs⁴ and 12 LPAs⁵.

In 26 out of 35 CPAs and 50% (6) of LPAs surveyed, there are boxes for collecting petitions (notifications, requests, proposals) received from citizens. At the same time, in 31 (out of 35) CPA and 7 (out of 12) LPA there is a functional online tool for petitions.

The table below shows the number of petitions (denunciations, requests, proposals) on **corruption-related topics**, received from citizens, during the last 5 years (2018 – 1st quarter 2022), compared to the total number of petitions received from citizens in the same period.

The data were arranged, based on the category of petitions, established by art. 9 paragraph (1) of the Administrative Code, in: notifications, requests and proposals. At the same time, the data are presented, faithfully, according to the qualifications made by the authorities. If the authority did not present, differentiated, data regarding notifications, requests and proposals, they were assigned to "petitions".

⁴Ministry of Finance (MF); Ministry of Defense (MA); Ministry of Health (MOH); Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI); Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MMPS); Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MAEIE); National Penitentiary Administration (ANP); Civil Aeronautical Authority (AEC); National Integrity Authority (ANI); Public Procurement Agency (AAP); Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources (AGRM); Environment Agency (EM); National Anti-Doping Agency (ANA); National Agency for Food Safety (ANSA); National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE); Public Property Agency (APP); Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance (APCSP); Material Reserves Agency (ARM); Interethnic Relations Agency (ARI); Land Relations and Cadastre Agency (ARFC); Public Services Agency (ASP); State Agency for Intellectual Property (ASPI); National Bank of Moldova (NBM); National Social Insurance House (CNAS); National Centre for the Protection of Personal Data (CNPDCP); Central Electoral Commission (CEC); National Financial Market Commission (CNPF); National Medical Insurance Company (CNAM); Superior Council of Prosecutors (CSP); General Carabinieri Inspectorate of the MAI (IGC of the MAI); General Police Inspectorate (IGP); Environmental Protection Inspection (IPM); Social Inspection (IS); Office of the People's Advocate (OAP); State Fiscal Service (SFS).

⁵Dondușeni District Council; Edineț District Council; Taraclia District Council; Strășeni District Council (Office of the District President); Ocnita District Council; The town hall of the village of Scaieni, Dondușeni; Frasin Town Hall, Dondușeni; The town hall of Sudarca commune, Dondușeni; Rezina City Hall; Balti City Hall; The president of Rîșcani district; Florești Environmental Protection Inspectorate


	The number of petitions (notification, requests, proposals) regarding the subjects <u>related to corruption</u> , received from citizens during the last 5 years		The number of petitions (denunciations, requests, proposals) received from citizens during the last 5 years	
	Aft	API	Aft	API
2018	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 304</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 190(NIA) and 33(MIA). 26 CPAs did not receive any notifications</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 75(NAP) and 6 (GPI). 25 CPAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 0</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 51118</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 9480 9 CPAs have not received any notifications</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 7544 10 CPAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 365 27 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 4293</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 38 6 LPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 4046 3 LPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 1 10 LPAs did not receive any proposals</p>
2019	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 741</p> <p><u>Notices</u> : 2(NAP), 534 (NIA), 2(MD), 15(MIA) and 5(CEC). 24 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 169(NAP) and 14 (GPI). 26 PCAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 1(NAP) 29 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 0</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 60 111</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 9916 10 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 15797 10 CPAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 314 25 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 3976</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 33 6 LPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 3321 3 LPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>
2020	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 910</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 830(NIA), 10(MIA) and 5(CEC). 26 CPAs did not receive any notifications</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 57(NAP) and 8 (GPI). 26 PCAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 0</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 46412</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 7684 10 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 15408 9 CPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 143 25 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 3751</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 45 6 LPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 3070 3 LPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>

2021	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 1422</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 2(NAP), 1(ACPMS), 1341(NIA), 15(MIA) and 8(CEC). 24 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 41(NAP), 1(ACPMS) and 13(GPI). 25 CPAs did not receive any application.</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 0</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 57108</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 8524 9 CPAs have not received any notifications</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 17382 9 CPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 37 25 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 3643</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 42 6 LPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 1746 2 LPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>
	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 288</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 1(NAP), 274 (NIA) and 1(MIA). 26 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 1(OAP), 4(NAP), 6(GPI) and 1(AM). 24 PCAs did not receive any application</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 0</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 0</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>	<p>Total petitions received by CPA: 9338</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 1749 10 CPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 4565 9 CPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 247 28 CPAs did not receive any proposals</p>	<p>Total petitions received by LPA: 980</p> <p><u>Notifications</u> : 9 5 LPAs did not receive any notification</p> <p><u>Requests</u> : 404 3 LPAs have not received any requests</p> <p><u>Proposals</u> : 0</p>

Figure 13: Number of petitions received by CPA and LPA during 2018-2022 (Q1)

According to the data provided by the public authorities, during the last 5 years, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova addressed to the central public authorities, in total, **3 665 petitions** on corruption subjects and none to the local public authorities (*Balti City Hall indicated the total number of petitions received, without distinguishing those related to corruption*).

Petitions regarding corruption issues were addressed to 9 authorities (see the Figure 14).



Caption :

ANI/ NIA - National Integrity Authority
 ANP/ NAP - National Administration of Penitentiaries
 MAI/ MIA - Ministry of Internal Affairs
 IGP/ GPI - General Police Inspectorate
 CEC - Central Electoral Commission
 MA/MD - Ministry of Defense
 APCSP/ ACPMS - Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance
 OAP – Onbudsman’s Office
 AM/ EA - Environment Agency

Figure 14: The number of petitions on subjects related to corruption, received from citizens in the period 2018 - 2022 (I quarter)

The majority of the petitions (notifications, requests) on corruption topics were addressed to the National Integrity Authority, legal bodies (National Penitentiary Administration, Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Police Inspectorate) and the Central Electoral Commission (corruption of voters).

According to the information provided by the authorities, during the last 5 years no petition was received on corruption subjects in the following 19 CPAs: Ministry of Finance, Public Property Agency, Public Procurement Agency, Land and Cadastre Agency, National Agency for Energy Regulation, National Food Safety Agency, Material Reserves Agency, Inter-Ethnic Relations Agency, State Agency for Intellectual Property, Geology and Mineral Resources Agency, Civil Aviation Authority, National Anti-Doping Agency, National Bank of Moldova, National Office of Social Insurance, the National Office of Insurance in Medicine, National Financial Market Commission, General Carabinieri Inspectorate of the MIA, Social Inspection, Environmental Protection Inspection.

Some public authorities did not provide information on the number of petitions received on corruption topics, presenting the total number of petitions received in the institution or citing the following reasons: *"do not have a separate record of notifications related to corruption"*, *"there is no such topic in the register"*. The lack of mechanisms for registration and control of petitions regarding corruption subjects in public authorities is regrettable, bearing in mind the fact that: corruption has been one of the major problems in our society for more than a decade; in the Republic of Moldova there is a satisfactory anti-corruption legal framework, which encourages the control of this type of petitions; 3 anti-corruption strategies have already been implemented (and all public authorities have reported). The lack of mechanisms to register and control petitions on corruption issues is worrying, especially in the case of institutions, which by the nature of their powers, should have been concerned with the integrity of the system they administer. For example, the Superior Council of Prosecutors, when asked to present information on the number of petitions regarding corruption topics, indicated *"no special record"*.

At the same time, shall be noted that the responses of some authorities constituted a standard of carelessness. For example, the Ministry of Health, although it presented data on the total number of petitions (reports), every time, when data on the number of requests were requested, it asked "*what does requests mean*", "*request -?*". The State Fiscal Service did not present any figures regarding any question, each time, indicating that "*SFS does not keep separate records of notifications..., citizens' requests..., ...citizens' proposals in 2018, ... 2019, ...2020, ... 2021, ... 2022*", and the Străseni District Council (the District President's Office) answered "*many*" to all the questions, which contained the request to provide statistical data.

d. Analysis and efficiency of the application of the petition mechanism by the public authorities

In order to analyze the efficiency of the application of the petition mechanism by the public authorities, they were asked about the number of notification, requests, proposals on subjects related to corruption, received from citizens during the last 5 years and resolved (S), in the process of solving (PS) and pending before the courts (IJ). This question was answered by the authorities, who submitted information on petitions on corruption topics.

	The number of notifications, requests, proposals regarding the subjects related to corruption, received from citizens during the last 5 years		
	solved (S)	in process of resolution (PS)	pending before the courts (IJ)
2018	<p>Total, resolved petitions: 190</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they did not resolve petitions on corruption-related topics: 28</p> <p>NIA - 190</p>	<p>Total, petitions in the resolution process: 191</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they do not have any petitions in the process of resolution on the topics related to corruption: 27</p> <p>NIA - 99 NAP - 75 MIA - 17</p>	<p>Total, petitions pending before the courts: 49</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they have no petitions regarding corruption-related topics pending before the courts: 28</p> <p>NIA - 33 MIA - 16</p>
2019	<p>Total, resolved petitions: 630</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they did not resolve petitions regarding corruption-related topics: 26</p> <p>NIA - 625 CEC - 5</p>	<p>Total, petitions in the resolution process: 424</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they do not have any petitions in the process of resolution regarding the topics related to corruption: 27</p> <p>NIA-247 NAP -171 MIA - 6</p>	<p>Total, petitions pending before the courts: 104</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they have no petitions regarding corruption-related topics pending before the courts: 28</p> <p>NIA - 95 MIA - 9</p>
2020	<p>Total, resolved petitions: 835</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they did not resolve petitions regarding corruption-related topics: 27</p> <p>YEARS - 830 CEC - 5</p>	<p>Total, petitions in the resolution process: 813</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they do not have any petitions in the process of resolution regarding the topics related to corruption: 27</p> <p>YEARS - 752 NAP - 57 MAY - 4</p>	<p>In total, petitions pending before the courts: 214</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they have no petitions regarding corruption-related topics pending before the courts: 28</p> <p>YEARS - 208 MAY - 6</p>

2021	<p>Total, resolved petitions: 1349</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they did not resolve petitions regarding corruption-related topics: 27</p> <p>NIA - 1341 CEC - 8</p>	<p>Total, petitions in the resolution process: 1354</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they do not have any petitions in the process of resolution regarding the subjects related to corruption: 26</p> <p>NIA - 1301 NAP - 43 MIA - 8 ACPMs - 2</p>	<p>Total, petitions pending before the courts: 453</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they have no petitions regarding corruption-related topics pending before the courts: 28</p> <p>NIA - 446 MIA - 7</p>
2022, I quarter.	<p>Total solved petitions: 277</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they did not resolve petitions regarding corruption-related topics: 26</p> <p>NIA - 274 NAP - 2 GPI-1</p>	<p>Total, petitions in the resolution process: 211</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they do not have any petitions in the process of resolution regarding the topics related to corruption: 25</p> <p>NIA-200 NAP - 3 GPI - 6 MIA - 1 AM -1</p>	<p>Total, petitions pending before the courts: 416</p> <p>The number of CPAs, which indicated that they have no petitions regarding corruption-related topics pending before the courts: 29</p> <p>NIA - 416</p>

Figure 14: Number of notifications, requests, proposals regarding corruption-related topics resolved, in the process of resolution and pending before the courts during the last 5 years

According to the public authorities, which registered petitions on topics related to corruption, in the period 2018 - I quarter 2022, in total, 3 281 petitions were resolved, 2 993 petitions regarding the topics related to corruption were/are in the process of resolution and 1 236 the petitions were/are pending before the courts.

During the last 5 years, NIA is the public authority with the majority of the petitions on corruption-related topics resolved (3 260), in the process of resolution (2 599) and pending before the courts (1 198). According to NIA during the years 2018-2022, I quarter:

- 61 minutes were concluded and entered in the record book regarding the *non-declaration or non-resolution of the conflict of interests* (art. 313² AC), which were challenged in 14 cases;
- 30 minutes were concluded and registered in the record book, regarding the *violation of the legal regime of incompatibilities and limitations applicable to public office or office of public dignity* (art. 313⁴ AC), which were disputed in 7 cases;
- Regarding *the violation of the rules for declaring wealth and personal interests* (art. 330² AC): 369 minutes were concluded and entered in the record register, and the respective decisions were issued; 11 appeals and 36 referrals to the prosecutor were registered; 333 sanctions were applied.

At the same time, the public authorities were asked if they assess the petition mechanism to be an effective mechanism for reporting corruption. 23 CPAs and 6 LPAs answered "yes". One CPA and LPA each did not respond, and the remaining 11 CPAs and 5 LPAs responded negatively.

The public authorities, which responded negatively, were asked to select one or more response options regarding the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the petition as a corruption reporting mechanism. The ranking of the options is as follows:

- citizens do not trust/are afraid (9)
- the system is not secure/does not ensure privacy (7)
- citizens do not know about this mechanism (6)

- the person is not sure of the finality of the examination of the petition (5)
- "it is a formal one, the system bears no responsibility " (free answer)

When asked about the necessary measures to improve the petitioning mechanism, the authorities offered the following solutions regarding:

citizens:

- *"increasing public awareness on this mechanism existence";*
- *"informing citizens about the petitioning mode and offering more possibilities to notify an institution, e.g. e-mail, telephone lines, online petitions, online questionnaires, typed forms, interactive database and others";*
- *"informing petitioners through the media, regarding the submission of petitions in accordance with the rules of the applicable legislation (Administrative Code no. 116/2018)";*
- *"continuous familiarization of citizens with the provisions of the Administrative Code related to the petitioning";*
- *"citizens' familiarization with the rules of the Administrative Code, regarding how to submit petitions";*
- *"informing consumers about their rights";*
- *"raise level of citizens' confidence in this mechanism".*

confidentiality and anonymity aspects:

- *"ensuring confidentiality, raising the level of trust by excluding corruption";*
- *"we consider that keeping the petitioner's data confidential would give petitioners more confidence in the petition review process";*
- *"giving citizens the possibility to express themselves confidentially/anonymously to have more confidence to submit a petition";*
- *"not to examine anonymous petitions (in writing, by e-mail, etc.), received without the identification data of the petitioner, in order to exclude the examination of abusive, unfounded and derogatory complaints against the institution or public official. Thus, the civil servant would be protected from unjustified complaints and would have the opportunity to sue the petitioner who defamed his image".*

using information technologies and securing information:

- *"development of the e-petition section";*
- *"the implementation of an easily accessible mechanism, which would give citizens the opportunity to use the electronic signature when filing complaints"*
- *"development of the system for recording the finality of criminal cases";*
- *"implementation of information security assurance tools".*

accountability and professional capacities strengthening:

- *"more prompt and diligent examination of petitions containing matters related to corruption acts";*
- *"the responsibility of all actors, what responsibility does the National Insurance Company bear for the poor quality medical services that it buys for citizens?";*
- *"improvement of the personnel involved in the examination and presentation of petitions".*

The public authorities made the following comments, which they considered important for the analysis of the effectiveness of the petitioning mechanism within the institution.

- *"a mechanism for verifying (examining) anonymous petitions would be welcome.";*

- *"the petitioning mechanism is more effective if it involves, among other things, periodic collection and systematization of information on subjects of interest to citizens and recurring issues, which are addressed in the context of petitions, which contributes to finding solutions faster";*

- *"provide effective help, we need more employees";*
- *"employee motivation".*

During the Focus group it was stated that *"people do not trust the state institutions", "for some officials the Administrative Code is a spaceship", "the public administration, officials sometimes falsify the documents, the procedure", "the state acts as an OPG"*⁶.

At the same time, shall be noted, that from the analysis of public sources, we could not identify evidence, which would demonstrate that currently the control of the examination of petitions by the CPA and LPA would have been achieved, at least, similar to the control of the mid-2000s⁷. On the website of the Government and the State Chancellery, no report regarding the examination of petitions was identified, and the annual activity reports of the State Chancellery refer only to the petitions examined by the State Chancellery.

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	1	Although there is a superior normative framework of a suitable quality, it is not developed through subordinate normative acts
Analysis and assessment of the level of use of the petition mechanism by citizens	1	The petition mechanism is partially used. The lack of a system for recording and controlling petitions regarding corruption, combined with the reluctance of public authorities to react to public requests, contributes to the decrease in the level of use of the petition mechanism by citizens.
Analysis and assessment of the level of application of institutional mechanisms for examining corruption petitions	1	The petition mechanism is partially used. In most public authorities, there is no system for recording and controlling petitions regarding corruption, and the quality, professionalism and integrity of civil servants are not a factor for strengthening the mechanism.

⁶OPG – organized criminal gang

⁷GD no. 98 of 06.02.2003 on the execution of the Decision of the RM Parliament no. 1495-XV of 28 November 2002 regarding the results of the control of the execution of Law no. 190-XIII of 19 July 1994 regarding the petition; HG no. 141 of 08.02.2006 regarding the efficiency of the examination of petitions and the organization of the audience; GD no. 1013 of 12.09.2007 for the approval of the Plan of measures regarding ensuring compliance with the right to petition, information and access to justice

III.3. WHISTLEBLOWING

Disclosure of illegal practices (whistleblowing) is one of the most effective mechanisms for reporting corruption by employees in the public and private sectors. The mechanism was first regulated back in 2013, when the Framework Regulation on whistleblowers was approved by [Government Decision 707/2013](#). Later, in 2018, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted [the Law on Whistleblowers](#), which modernized the mechanism of whistleblowers (hereinafter - Law 122/2018), aligned with international and regional standards, taking into account the approaches of the whistleblowers' protection at the European level.

a. Regulation

According to the Law 122/2018, **the whistleblowing** is a disclosure made in good faith by **an employee** of an illegal practice that represents a threat or harms the public interest. The law details that the respective disclosures may concern:

- **corruption manifestations**, as defined and listed in the Integrity Law no. 82/2017;
- environmental violations;
- violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person;
- violations related to national security;
- as well as other violations, actions or inactions that threaten or harm the public interest.

The authorities responsible for examining the disclosures of illegal practices are employers (public or private entities), in the case of internal disclosures of illegal practices, and the National Anticorruption Centre, in the case of external disclosures of illegal practices

The normative framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Integrity Law, no. 82/2017• Law on whistleblowers, no. 122/2018• Government Decision for the approval of the Regulation on the internal examination and reporting procedures of disclosures of illegal practices, no. 23/2020
Beneficiaries/users	<p>Competent authorities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• employers – authority to review disclosures of illegal practices and protect whistleblowers;• National Anticorruption Centre – the authority for examining disclosures of illegal practices;• the Ombudsman – the authority for the protection of whistleblowers. <p>The whistleblowing instrument of is applicable in the field of labor relations, the main beneficiaries being employees and employers, both from the public and private sectors.</p> <p>Employer - public or private entity that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• entered into legal labor relations with an employee;• entered into contractual, civil legal relations with an employee. <p>The meaning of the employee notion within the Law 122/2018 covers the following categories of persons who:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• are or have been in the last 12 months an employee, within the meaning of labor legislation, in relation to an employer;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are or have been in the last 12 months an intern or volunteer, in relation to an employer; • has or had in the last 12 months contractual, civil legal relations with an employer;
Scope (public/private/general)	Public and private sector in labor relations
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>Law 122/2018 establishes 3 ways to disclose illegal practices:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal: to the employer; • External: to the NAC; • Publicly: using media channels and sources, social networks, public events, etc. <p>The reviewing authorities may establish internal channels for communicating disclosures of illegal practices and internal whistleblowing (<i>hotlines, mailboxes, e-mail addresses</i>)</p> <p>Disclosure of the illegal practice is done:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in writing, on paper, being signed by the employee; • on-line via the electronic disclosure system; • it is communicated to the anti-corruption hotlines of the employers, of the examining authorities. <p>The disclosure is made by filing the illegal practice disclosure form by the employee or, as the case may be, by the telephone line operator.</p>

b. Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	<p>The Law 122/2018 created the higher normative framework necessary for the whistleblowing mechanism which was preceded by the general rules of the Law 82/2017.</p> <p>The evaluation of the norms of Law 122/2018 reveals a concise and comprehensive character, the norms have a relative clarity and predictability, being timely and applicable. Shall be noted that the predictability of the rules, especially on the part related to the application of sanctions, was temporarily compromised, given that the misdemeanor liability was established only in 2022.</p> <p>Comparative analysis of the provisions of Law 122/2018 and art. 18 para. (5) of Law 82/2017 in the part concerning the sanctioning of the public agent for submitting a warning “in bad faith”, shows that they are not congruent. Art. 18 of Law 122/2018, which provides the liability for violating the rules on whistleblowing, does not include liability for whistleblowing “in bad faith”, the whistleblower benefiting from the presumption of “good faith” during the entire period of registration and examination of the whistleblowing, and the burden of overturning this presumption rests with the employer, without the possibility of sanctioning the whistleblower.</p>
The level of development of the normative	The provisions of the Law 122/2018 were further developed with a delay of about 2 years through GD 23/2020, which regulated the procedures for examination and internal reporting of illegal practices. Later (in 2022), with a delay of almost 4 years,

framework through subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones	<p>the rules on misdemeanoral sanctions for violating the provisions of the Law 122/2018 were adopted.</p> <p>Also, for the proper implementation of the Law 122/2018, a joint Order of the NAC and Ombudsman was adopted in 2019 (the main actors of the whistleblowing mechanism) by which the main methodological benchmarks of the procedure for ensuring the observance of the whistleblowers' rights were set.</p> <p>Employers (public and private entities), in line with GD 23/2020, approved the internal procedures for recording and examining disclosures of illegal practices (in the form of regulations or standard operating procedures - SOP). There is no information on the number of acts adopted or the authorities that adopted these rules.</p>
The quality of the subordinate normative framework	<p>The subordinated normative acts observe the regulatory limits imposed on the subordinated legislation. At the same time, we shall reiterate that the deadlines imposed by Law 122/2018 for the elaboration/adoption of the subordinate normative framework were not respected.</p> <p>The legal norms included in the subsequent acts of Law 122/2018 are, in general, concise and comprehensive, they are clear, predictable, timely and applicable. However, in the opinion of the public agents, the authorities, as well as the focus group participants, there is persisting the idea that: the system is not yet fully understood, respectively less applicable; the protective measures are insufficient; the examining system does not ensure full trust or confidentiality.</p>
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	<p>Law 122/2018 was drafted in accordance with the international standards in the field, in particular - the UN Convention on Corruption, as well as with the recommendations of the Council of Europe in the field. Also, the Law and the subsidiary regulatory framework generally complies with the EU Directive on the protection of persons reporting breaches of the Union law.</p>
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	<p>Law 122/2018 and the normative acts resulting from it contains some provisions that can generate “<i>excessive discretion in application</i>”, “<i>limited access to information and lack of transparency</i>”. At the same time, as was also mentioned in the focus group discussions, apart from the judicial control, which intervenes already at an advanced stage of the whistleblowing mechanism, the Law 122/2018 and the subordinate acts the “<i>lack/insufficiency of the mechanisms of control</i>”.</p> <p>Even if the existence of internal whistleblower procedures and their application can be the subject of the NAC's institutional integrity assessment, these assessments are complex and are carried out on a limited type of public entities. One of the greatest vulnerabilities of the regulatory framework regarding whistleblowers is the <i>lack of control and accountability mechanisms for employers</i>.</p>

c. Analysis and assessment of the level of use of whistleblowing by citizens

The Mapping Report of Corruption Complaint Mechanisms (which preceded the present study) provided some criteria for categorizing complaint mechanisms: formal and informal; applicable to the public sector, to the private sector and only for the public sector; created for all citizens and only employees, etc.

Unlike the previous complaint mechanisms (petition, complaint/denouncement), the whistleblowing is part of the group of formal mechanisms that can only be used by people with employee status in both public and private sectors.

The survey of public sector authorities showed that employees are reluctant to use this mechanism, with only 4 whistleblowers registered in the period 2018-2022 (see more details in section **d.** below).

However, the inapplicability of the whistleblowing mechanism is also generated by the ignorance of this mechanism by the employees, those who could make use of this mechanism. This hypothesis is also confirmed by the results of the NIAS Impact Assessment Study⁸ which showed that: the majority of respondents (public agents) declared that any ordinary citizen can be a whistleblower (59%). According to other opinions, any employee of a public institution or private company (10%), the person who has whistleblower status (11%) or any public agent (7%) can be the person who reports a corruption manifestation. Therefore, still only **few public agents have correct knowledge about "who is the whistleblower"**.

The reluctance of employees to communicate corruption manifestations is also confirmed by the Study cited above, according to which: "during the last 12 months **only 6 people** confirmed that they witnessed some corruption acts within the institution where they work. Out of these 6 people who admitted that they witnessed corruption acts, **half did not denounce the cases**. Among the most frequently cited reasons for not reporting corruption manifestations among colleagues are:

- lack of evidence for the witnessed corruption act (49%),
- lack of effective protection measures (32%),
- loyalty to the organization and colleagues,
- fear of not suffering later,
- the belief that no action will be taken on the reported situation anyway.

Public employees are also sceptical about the effectiveness of the protection measures applied to whistleblowers, or approximately **every 10th respondent** is not sure whether they will be protected or not.

The discussions in the focus group reconfirmed the conclusions stated above regarding public agents' lack of knowledge of the specific and stages of the whistleblowing mechanism. There were mentioned cases when the prosecutors and judges do not distinguish a whistleblowing disclosure and an ordinary corruption reporting. Moreover, it was mentioned that when the Ombudsperson presented its conclusions in the courts on the whistleblowers' status of some persons against whom retaliatory actions were taken, these conclusions were either ignored, or the court invoked in a formal and distorted Ombudsperson's allegations regarding whistleblowers.

The biggest challenge that emerged in the process of analyzing the data of the above-mentioned Study, of the answers to the questionnaires addressed to public entities, as well as from the discussions in the focus group, relies in the change of approach, mentality of the employees in the Republic of Moldova. Employees hesitate to submit whistleblowing disclosures in order to avoid being categorized as "turners" - a pose less accepted and welcomed in our society. In the

⁸Impact assessment tool of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2020 (SNIA). The purpose of the study is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the implementation of the 2017-2020 SNIA, based on the impact and progress indicators stipulated in the strategy, as well as to better understand the public's experience and perception of corruption. The study was carried out within The "Fight against corruption by strengthening integrity in the Republic of Moldova" project, implemented by UNDP Moldova with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The purpose of the study is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the implementation of the 2017-2020 SNIA, based on the indicators of impact and progress stipulated in the strategy, as well as to better understand the public's experience and perception of corruption.

same way, it was argued that any proactive anti-corruption action on the part of the employees - whether denunciation or whistleblowing disclosure, subsequently involves excessive bureaucracy, wasting time resources ("walking the streets"), without having the certainty of a correct and effective investigation of reported facts.

d. Analysis and efficiency of the application of the mechanism of whistleblowing by public authorities

In order to assess how public authorities use/apply the mechanism of whistleblowing, an online questionnaire was developed and distributed to 145 authorities: CPA, LPA, autonomous public authorities (APA) and administrative authorities (AA). The questionnaires were completed only by 54⁹(37%) of the surveyed authorities, most of them representing CPA.




Figure 15: Distribution of authorities' responses

The authorities surveyed were asked to provide information and data on:

- Existence in the institution of the system for recording and examining whistleblowing disclosures***

The summary of the answers of the authorities shows that the majority 48 (**87%**) state that the system would have been established within the authority. 13% of the authorities noted the lack of the internal system: 5 LPAs of level I (town halls) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.

⁹ National Anti-Doping Agency, Social Inspection, Dondușeni District Council, Ombudsperson's Office, the Criscăuți town hall r. Dondușeni, the Civil Aeronautical Authority, the Superior Council of Magistrates, Town Hall of the Scafeni village, the Town Hall of the Sculeni village, Office of Migration and Asylum, Town Hall of Frasin r. Dondușeni, Town Hall Sudarcar commune, General Police Inspectorate, Inter-Ethnic Relations Agency, Material Reserves Agency, Office of the President of Rîșcani District, Ministry of Defense, Taraclia District Council, Balti City Hall, Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Customs Service, National Integrity Authority, the Călărași district council, the Geology and Mineral Resources Agency, National Social Insurance House, Ministry of Defense, Cahul Environmental Protection Inspection, Florești Environmental Protection Inspection, State Tax Service, Central Electoral Commission, Consi Superior League of Prosecutors, National Bank of Moldova, Strășeni District Council (Office of the District President), State Agency for Intellectual Property, National Financial Market Commission, General Carabinieri Inspectorate of MIA, National Food Safety Agency, Public Procurement Agency, Company National Medical Insurance Agency, Land and Cadastre Agency, Public Institution "Public Services Agency", National Social Assistance Agency, Environment Agency, Ministry of Justice, Ocnița district council, Competition Council of the Republic of Moldova, National Penitentiary Administration, Ministry of Labor and of Social Protection, Public Property Agency, National Centre for Personal Data Protection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, National Anti-Corruption Centre

As for 4 of the 5 town halls that did not create the internal system for whistleblowing, shall be mentioned that they do not have such an obligation, taking into account the provisions of p.5 of the [Regulation on the procedures for examination and internal reporting of disclosures of illegal practices](#) which states that: “the establishment of internal communication channels of illegal practices disclosures and internal whistleblowing is mandatory for large and medium-sized entities, regardless of the nature of their activities. Employees of micro and small entities may make external and public disclosures”. However, this exception is not valid in the case of the Bălți Municipality City Hall, which had to establish the internal system, taking into account the organizational and numerical structure of the entity that falls into the category of "medium-sized entities", obliged to create the necessary infrastructure for the operation of the mechanism.

As for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), we believe that the lack of an internal system is a problem, including from the perspective of the sensitive field administered by the ministry. The lack of an internal system within the MFAEI was also stated by the [Report on the implementation by the Moldovan public authorities of 10 anti-corruption policies](#), which noted “the lack of understanding of the anti-corruption policies and some confusions between them (conflicts of interest, undue influences, whistleblowing), as well as the lack of any progress in their implementation”.

At the same time, we shall mention that not all questioned authorities completed the questionnaire, and some of the authorities, even if they mentioned the existence of the internal system, neglected to mention that it has not been updated since 2014 and contains obsolete elements, or mandatory elements of the internal system are missing.

During the focus group organized with the representatives of public authorities and the judicial system, it was mentioned that "the regulations regarding whistleblowers at the level of the SCM have not been adjusted to the new Law 122/2018, nor is there any opening from the SCM, to make the mechanism functional. This state of affairs is highlighted by the lack of reaction of the CSM to a series of disclosures by judges in the last 3 years regarding the illegalities in the system ". We shall mention that the answers provided by the SCM mention the existence of the internal system, but since 2018 until now no whistleblowing disclosures have been registered.

- ***Designation of a person responsible for recording and reviewing warnings***

As in the case of the establishment of the internal system, most of the entities reported on the designation of the persons responsible for keeping the register, with the exception of the previously mentioned authorities (5 LPA and MFAEI).


- ***Establishing the register of whistleblowing***

Regarding to the establishment of the Whistleblowing Disclosures Register, the summary of the answers reflect an interesting situation: 3 authorities¹⁰ who stated about the establishment of the internal system and the designation of the persons responsible for the registration of whistleblowing disclosures answered that they have not established the register, either it is "in process ". At the same time, the 5 town halls and the MFAEI answered that they have not

¹⁰ The National Administration of Penitentiaries, the Agency for Geology and Material Resources and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection

established the register, the answer being consistent with the previously reported situation: the system is not established, the person is not designated.

- **Number of recorded whistleblowing disclosures (during 2018-2022)**



4 warnings were registered: 1 in 2019 (Ministry of Defense) and 3 in 2021 (State Agency for Intellectual Property Protection, State Fiscal Service and Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance).

Figure 16: Whistleblowing recorded by authorities in 2018-2022

During the public presentation of this report, on October 6, 2022, the NAC representative pointed out that the data included in the report do not include the external disclosures of illegal practices and mentioned that during 2018-2022, **NAC recorded 11 whistleblowing disclosures.**

- **Number of whistleblowing disclosures examined (2018-2022)**

According to the authorities that stated that whistleblowing disclosure were registered (4), all whistleblowing disclosures were examined and whistleblowers were informed on the results of the review.

- **Number of protection requests (2018-2022)**

Regarding the request for protective measures, it was certified that this was requested only in 2 cases (the Ministry of Defense and the State Agency for the Protection of Intellectual Property).

The Ombudsperson's Report, the authority empowered by the Law 122/2018 with the competence of providing protection to whistleblowers in the case of external and public disclosures of illegal practices, shows that "in the period 2019-2021, 11 requests were registered by the Ombudsperson (7 requests in 2021) whereas people who consider themselves whistleblowers requested protection from the Ombudsperson. Out of all examined requests, only in one case it solved the case by restoring the rights of the person. Following the recommendations of the Ombudsman, the employer "acknowledged the mistake" and ceased any form of revenge on the whistleblower".

In addition to the information and data above, the authorities have been asked to comment on whether the whistleblowing mechanism is effective. The majority of authorities 47 (87%) consider that the whistleblowing mechanism is an effective mechanism.

The 13% of authorities who opted for the answer "it is not effective" were invited to specify the reasons of the mechanism's inefficiency. The most frequent causes referred to:

- fear of employees;
- the system is not secure/does not ensure confidentiality;
- the person is not sure of the purpose of the examination of the whistleblowing disclosure;
- the employer has no interest in highlighting the illegalities that can be committed in the public entity that he/she is leading and for which he/she is responsible, therefore the mechanism does not work;
- as long as the corruption in state institutions exists, at all levels, the mechanism of whistleblowing will not work.

The analysis of the reasons of the authorities who consider the mechanism ineffective shows that they are similar to the answers of the employees - subjects who could make use of this mechanism, but hesitate to do so, as evidenced by the data on the recorded whistleblowing.

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	1	Although there is a regulatory framework, it is not of a suitable quality
Analysis and evaluation of the level of use of the integrity warning mechanism by citizens	1	The mechanism is partially used. Employees either do not know about the whistleblowing mechanism or are reluctant to apply it due to fear of retaliation, lack of effective safeguards and the belief that the reported situation will not be improved
Analysis and assessment of the level of enforcement of whistleblowing by public authorities	1	The mechanism is partially applied. The authorities, as employers, have not created satisfactory conditions for the effective implementation of the whistleblowing mechanism.

III.4. UNDUE INFLUENCES REPORTING

The mechanism for reporting undue influences, as well as the whistleblowing, is a formal mechanism for reporting corruption manifestations applicable only to employees. Unlike whistleblowing, which is a right, undue influences reporting is an obligation of public sector employees.

The reporting of undue influences was included in the national normative framework in 2013, with the adoption of Law no. 325/2013 on professional integrity testing. One of the purposes of Law 325/2013 was the non-admitting undue influences in the exercise of the duties or duties of public officials.

a. Regulation

In the sense of Law 325/2013, **undue influence** represents any attempt, action, pressure, threat, interference or illegal request of third parties in order to determine public agents to perform or not, to delay or speed up the performance of actions in the exercise of their functions or contrary to them. Later, in September 2014, the Government approved [the Framework Regulation on the record of cases of undue influence](#), which established the procedure for communication and record of undue influences exercised on public agents, the bookkeeping of the registry for reporting undue influences.

The normative framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law on institutional integrity assessment, no. 325/2013 • Integrity Law, no. 82/2017 • Government Decision no. 767/2014 for the implementation of Law no. 325 of December 23, 2013 on professional integrity testing
Beneficiaries/users	Public agents , within the meaning of Law 82/2017: persons employed in a public entity and who exercise a public office, a public office with a special status, a position of public dignity, are employed in the office of the person with a public dignity function or provide services of public interest, as well as the local elected
Scope (public/private/general)	The public sector
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>For all public employees: The communication of undue influence is done without delay, but at the latest within three working days, in the form of a written complaint, submitted to the head of the public entity at the specialized subdivision or, as the case may be, to the institution that carries out the professional integrity testing. The written complaint is registered under confidential conditions in a Register with limited access by a person specifically designated for this activity.</p> <p>If the undue influence is done on the head of the public entity / self-administration body or exercised by the head of the public entity, by a public agent within the hierarchically superior public entity, the public agent communicates to the NAC through one of the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • written complaint, sent to the NAC address, including via the e-mail indicated on the official NAC web page; • completing the online communication form of undue influences on the official website of the NAC, directly by the public agent or to the operator of the

	national anti-corruption line within the NAC, provided that the public agent communicates all the information necessary to complete the form.
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b. Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	The declaration of undue influences is regulated by 2 laws: Law 325/2013 on institutional integrity assessment and Integrity Law 82/2017. The norms integrated in both laws are concise and comprehensive, they are clear and predictable.
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinated normative acts, including departmental ones	The Law 325/2013 was further developed by GD 767/2014, which approved the Framework Regulation on the record of cases of undue influence, and this regulation had to be adapted and approved by public entities. At the same time, most CPA's report that they have approved internal regulations, but the exact record and control of the execution of these regulations does not exist at a centralized level. The control of the implementation of these rules is only possible within the institutional integrity assessment exercises conducted by NAC, controls that are sporadic and are initiated only after the risk assessment in certain areas.
The quality of the subordinated normative framework	The analysis of the subordinated normative framework did not detect substantial deficiencies, which would affect the implementation of GD 767/2014 and which observes the regulatory limits provided by Law 325/2013 and Law 82/2017.
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	There are no international standards, specifically devoted to the mechanism of reporting undue influences. However, art.8 of the UN Convention on Corruption can be invoked to the extent that it provides that: <i>"Each state party shall consider, according to the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to apply measures and systems to facilitate reporting through public agents of the competent authorities of corruption acts that they became aware of in the exercise of their functions."</i>
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	The analysis of the provisions of both laws, as well as of GD 767/2014, does not indicate the existence of critical vulnerability factors, except for the lack of permanent control of the implementation of the provisions.

c. Analysis and evaluation of the reporting of undue influences mechanism level of use by citizens

The analysis of the data provided by the authorities, as well as the focus group discussions, showed that the mechanism for reporting undue influences is more effective, compared to whistleblowing, because it is binding. Moreover, the statistical data (given in [section d.](#) below) show that the number of declarations of undue influences clearly exceeds the number of whistleblowing registered by the authorities. [The NIAS impact assessment study](#) cited above also contains data on the degree of information and openness of employees to report undue influences. Thus, the Study data show that:

- according to public agents, the cases of undue influences in the institutions where they work were very few during the last 12 months;

- none of the respondents was asked or forced during this period to abuse power, embezzle or steal public money or public goods, participate in extortion of funds, traffic in influence.
- almost all respondents stated that they were not asked/required to solicit or offer a bribe (99%), to protect, support or favor someone at work (99%);
- only 1% of the respondents (6 people) were affected by undue influences at work during the last 12 months. The vast majority of them (83%) preferred not to report the cases;
- the survey participants were asked if the institutions in which they work have a register of undue influences. 18% (compared to 23% in 2017) mentioned that their organization has such a register, and 26% stated that the institution does not have such a document.
- every 4th public agent does not know if there is a register of undue influences in the institution, and 1/3 of the public agents heard this phrase for the first time.

Based on the data shown above, we conclude that although the statistics regarding the undue influences reporting are more optimistic, compared to the whistleblowing disclosures, still the share of those who do not know (30%) and, respectively, do not use to this mechanism is worrying. There is also a reluctance of employees to declare undue influences, when they are exercised. The main reason cited is that people do not believe that the situation will be resolved (60%) and because they had concerns about the attitude of their colleagues (40%).

d. Analysis and efficiency of the undue influences reporting mechanism application by public authorities

The online questionnaire was completed by only **49¹¹(33%)** of the surveyed authorities, the majority being CPA.




Figure 18: Distribution of authorities' responses

¹¹ National Anti-Doping Agency, Social Inspection, Ministry of Health, Ombudsperson's Office, Civil Aeronautics Authority, Town Hall of Scaieni village, Superior Council of Magistrates, Migration and Asylum Office, Frasin R. Dondușeni Town Hall, Sudarca Town Hall, General Police Inspectorate, Inter-Ethnic Relations Agency, Material Reserves Agency, Riscani District President's Office, Taraclia District Council, Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance Agency, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Customs Service, National Integrity Authority, Geology and Mineral Resources Agency, National Social Insurance House, Ministry of Defence, Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, Balti City Hall, Central Electoral Commission, Superior Council of Prosecutors, the National Bank of Moldova, Strășeni District Council (Office of the District President), Agency National Agency for Food Safety, General Carabinieri Inspectorate of the MAI, National Financial Market Commission, State Agency for Intellectual Property, Public Procurement Agency, the National Medical Insurance Company, Public Institution "Public Services Agency", National Social Assistance Agency, Environment Agency, Ministry of Justice, Ocnîța District Council, Competition Council of the Republic of Moldova, National Penitentiary Administration, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Public Property Agency, National Centre for Personal Data Protection, National Anti-Corruption Centre

The surveyed authorities were asked to provide information and data on:

- **Existence in the institution of the system for declaring undue influences**

Most of the institutions that responded to the questionnaire **41 (84%)** reported the existence of the internal system for the declaration of undue influence (DUI), while 6 LPAs noted its absence. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection informed that it is in the process of creating the system (explainable, including from the perspective of the CPA reform - the division of ministries), and the City Hall of Balti municipality informed that "according to Law 325/2013 and GD no. 767/2014, Balti Municipality City Hall is not a public entity that falls under the scope of Law 355 and does not have the obligation to keep records of undue influences cases".




Figure 19: Distribution of answers regarding the existence of the DUI internal system

- **Designating a responsible person for recording undue influence**

Majority of entities reported on the designation of persons responsible for keeping the register, with the exception of 6 LPAs.

- **Establishment of the register of undue influences**

In 8 authorities out of the 49 that responded to the questionnaire, the Register of undue influences was not established. A similar situation is being noticed in the case of whistleblowing: some authorities invoke the creation of a system for DIN, the designation of a responsible person, but without establishing the register for the DIN record.

- **Number of registered undue influences (in the period 2018-2022)**

The surveyed authorities were asked to provide statistical data on the number of undue influences registered within the internal systems. Surprisingly, even compared to the whistleblowing mechanism, we find that DUI is more widely applied and used by public agencies. Thus, in the period 2018-2022 (quarter I), a total of **39 complaints** were registered regarding reporting of undue influences by the employees in **13 institutions**. The distribution by year is shown in the Figure below.




Figure 20: Undue influences recorded by authorities in 2018-2022

From the perspective of the authorities that registered undue influences, we attest to the distribution in the table below.

#	Name of the authority	# FROM
1	National Integrity Authority	1
2	National Administration of Penitentiaries	4
3	Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance	1
4	National Bank of Moldova	1
5	National Anticorruption Centre	5
6	Central Electoral Commission	1
7	Superior Council of Magistracy	4
8	General Police Inspectorate	14
9	General Carabineers Inspectorate	1
10	Ministry of Interior	2
11	Ministry of Defence	2
12	Ministry of Finance	1
13	Customs Service	1

Figure 21: Distribution of DIN

The wider use of this mechanism for public agents is apparently justified by:

- the mandatory nature: public agents are obliged to denounce undue influences;
- the occurrence of disciplinary sanctions for not reporting undue influences.

Herewith, it should be taken into account that this mechanism is a component of the institutional integrity assessment, implicitly of the professional integrity testing in which the compliance of the public agents with the obligation to report undue influences is also verified.

• ***Number of disciplinary procedures for failure to report undue influence (2018-2022)***

The initiation of the disciplinary procedures for not reporting undue influences, as the summary of responses shows, is applied only by one authority - the General Police Inspectorate, which initiated **14 disciplinary procedures** regarding employees who did not report undue influences.

- ***Informing employees about the mechanism for reporting undue influences***

According to the answers obtained from the authorities (100%), the employees are informed at the employment about the obligation to report undue influences.

In addition to the above information and data, the authorities have been asked to comment on whether the undue influences reporting mechanism is effective. **84% (41)** of the responding authorities believe that denouncing undue influences is an **effective mechanism**.

The authorities that opted for the "ineffective" option cited the following reasons:

- the system is not secure/does not ensure privacy;
- employees don't trust/are afraid;
- the person doesn't have the confidence of the finality of the undue influences report examination;
- employees do not know about this mechanism.

The response options shown above are identical to the concerns of employees who hesitate to use this tool. However, according to the discussions in the focus group, it was mentioned that the reporting of undue influences is more effective than the whistleblowing disclosure, because it is an obligation of the employees and there is a risk of applying sanctions for non-reporting.

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	2	There is a regulatory framework that regulates how to apply the complaint mechanism, which is of a suitable quality
Analysis and evaluation of the undue influences reporting mechanism level of use by citizens	1	The mechanism is partially used. Employees either do not know about the undue influences reporting mechanism, or they are reluctant to apply it due to doubts that the reported situation will be rectified and the concern about the attitude of co-workers.
Analysis and assessment of the level of application of the undue influences reporting by the authorities	1	The mechanism is partially applied. The authorities, as employers, have not created satisfactory conditions for the effective implementation of the undue influences reporting mechanism.

III.5. SPECIALIZED/NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LINES

In 2005, the Government of the Republic of Moldova established **government hotlines** for receiving information about corruption. After a short time, it turned out that these were not working efficiently (either *the calls were not answered, the lines were always busy or they were redirected to other authorities, etc.*). Citizens have been helped by a number of information initiatives, created and supported by civil society organizations¹² in external assistance projects, which have informed citizens about the steps to be taken to report corruption and cover general information needs.

Since 2011, the authorities have stepped up their efforts to set up a national corruption reporting mechanism to ensure that all the complaints are recorded and the authorities involved in preventing and combating corruption are accountable. This mechanism has helped to simplify access and the dialogue procedure between citizens and specialized authorities.

In 2013, the normative framework regulating the operation of the anti-corruption telephone line system was adopted, which includes three levels:

1. The national anti-corruption line (managed by NAC);
2. Specialized anti-corruption lines (managed by public entities that have an internal security subdivision);
3. Information lines.

a. Regulation

The normative framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013 for the approval of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption telephone line system; • Integrity Law, no. 82/2017.
Beneficiaries/users	The users of the national anti-corruption line and of the specialized anti-corruption lines, as a rule, are the persons benefiting from the services provided by the public entity and the persons who know and want to communicate information on commission of corrupted behavior acts or by the public agents.
Scope (public/private/general)	General scope, as it can be used by all interested persons.
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>National anti-corruption line and specialized anti-corruption lines can be accessed by phone by calling the number indicated on the public entity's website.</p> <p>Calls are received by the operator or robot and are immediately recorded in the Calls Register.</p> <p>The national anti-corruption line operates non-stop (24/24) and the call to this number is free (080055555).</p> <p>Public authorities promote the anti-corruption hotlines by conducting social information campaigns, using various means of information: printed materials</p>

¹² For example, the Anti-Corruption Hotline 92-79-79, launched as part of the "Raising Awareness of Corruption" project implemented by the Center for the Analysis and Prevention of Corruption with the financial support of the British Embassy in Chisinau.

	(posters, brochures, leaflets, etc.), banners, video/audio spots, web pages of the authorities.
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b. Analysis and evaluation of the normative framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	<p>The Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption telephone line system, approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013, defines the mechanism for the establishment and operation of telephone lines, as well as the authorities responsible for managing these lines, establishes the obligation of public entities to establish Registers of records of calls and designate subdivisions/persons responsible for handling them.</p> <p>The regulation divides the management competence of the anti-corruption hotline system in the following way: the National Anti-Corruption Centre is entrusted with the National Anti-Corruption Line, and the specialized anti-corruption hotlines are entrusted to the subdivisions of internal security and control of the public entities that have such subdivisions, and the institutional hotlines for information are established at the level of central, local and autonomous public entities with the aim of increasing the transparency of their activity.</p> <p>The regulation is concise and comprehensive, and the rules established are clear and coincide with the competences of the authorities and subdivisions in charge of managing the telephone lines. The rules are predictable and timely in the context of preventing and fighting corruption at the national level and the need to increase the degree of transparency of the institutions.</p>
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinated normative acts, including departmental ones	The regulation approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013 is directly applicable at the level of all public entities, in addition to which it is necessary to approve the call record register and the designation of the person or subdivision responsible for management, which can be done through an internal act (provision /order of/of the leader).
The quality of the subordinated normative framework	In the case of the anti-corruption hotline system, the normative framework does not require additional regulations to those approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013, with the exception of the internal documents approving the calls record register and designating the person responsible for managing the telephone line, as well as the phone number.
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	<p>The rules of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption hotline system correspond to the statutory principles of the UN Convention against Corruption and the instruments of the GRECO Group of States against Corruption.</p> <p>Likewise, the provisions of the Regulation correspond to the purpose of the Integrity Law no. 82/2017.</p>
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	<p>In general, the existing regulatory framework is clear and does not contain ambiguous wording. Since the Regulation is the only act that regulates this mechanism, there are no conflicts of law.</p> <p>The excessive discretion of public entities in the process of applying the Regulation generated a superficial approach to the mechanism (Specialized Lines and Information Lines), without developing and adapting this instrument</p>

to its own specifics, with the exception of the National Anti-corruption Line, whose regulation expressly establishes the method of receiving calls and analysis of information received on the line. The information about the degree of use of these telephone lines is not always public and/or is not found in the annual activity reports of public entities, thus creating impediments for the transparency of the application of this mechanism and its efficiency.

c. Analysis and evaluation of the national anti-corruption line and the specialized anti-corruption lines level of use by citizens

The National Anticorruption Line is part of the anticorruption hotline system and is managed by NAC, which has a designated subdivision responsible for receiving and recording calls.




Figure 23: The evolution of the number of calls registered during the period 2018-2022 (quarter I) to the National Anticorruption Hotline

In the period of 2018-2022, NAC received **11,567 calls**. These calls are recorded in a specially established register. In this diagram, a relatively stable dynamic can be observed with significant decreases in 2020 and 2021, when the interaction between the citizen and the authorities was affected by the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The public entities confirmed the presence of the calls management mechanism for the specialized anti-corruption lines in a share of 46%, of which 100% have designated persons responsible for receiving calls to the specialized lines and have established registers to record calls. Another 50% did not establish this mechanism and 4% neither confirmed nor denied.




Figure 24: Share of authorities that have a call management mechanism for the specialized anti-corruption line

In the period of 2018-2022, within the public entities that have a specialized anti-corruption line, approximately **7 618** calls were registered, thus confirming the usefulness of this tool.

Following the analysis of the answers presented by the public entities that established the call management mechanism for the

specialized anti-corruption line, we conclude the following data regarding the number of calls registered: in 2018, the specialized lines were the most intensively requested, unlike in 2019, where we observe a significantly lower degree of use, by about 30%.




Figure 25: Evolution of the number of calls registered to specialized anti-corruption lines during the years 2018-2022 (quarter I)

In 2021, the situation improved, with the number of calls increasing by more than 12% compared to 2019. The first quarter of 2022 indicates a significant increase compared to the previous 3 years and offers real reasons for reaching by the end of the year the maximum reached in the year 2018.

The analysis of the following diagram, shows that the public entities where the specialized lines were most intensively used and the evolution of calls over time.




Figure 26: Evolution of the number of calls registered to the specialized anti-corruption lines of the GPI, Public Services Agency/PSA, MIA and other entities (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense, Fiscal Service, etc.) during the period 2018-2022 (Q1).

Shall be noticed that the MIA's specialized line was the most intensively used, registering over 3000 calls during the studied period. Similarly, GPI has recorded 2488 calls, followed by PSA with over 1500 calls and MF with 360 calls. The other entities (Ministry of Defense, Fiscal Service) received approximately less than 200 calls. Less used are the specialized lines of NAP, PPA, NACM, GCI and NCFM, which recorded up to 10 calls during the entire period.

The number of actual calls indicates the level of understanding by citizens and beneficiaries of the purpose of the telephone line and its utility.

At the same time, the Impact Assessment Study of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy - 2021 edition, carried out as part of the project implemented by UNDP Moldova "Curbing corruption by strengthening sustainable integrity" revealed that the preferred method for reporting chosen by citizens is the National Anti-Corruption Line, approximately 55% of citizens and 51% of economic agents (11/14% less than in 2017) chose this option in favor of direct reporting to anti-corruption agencies (14/18%) or online reporting on the NAC website. The second preferred reporting method is the hotline of the institution where the bribe was demanded: 25% chose this reporting method, by 4/7% more than in 2017.

Fig. 36 If you (still) had to notify corrupt practices, which method(s) would you prefer for doing that? (J7) MAXIMUM 3 RESPONSES




Figure 32: The evolution of the preferred method of citizens and businesses to report corruption act, according to the Study carried out by UNDP Moldova

In the questionnaires applied to public institutions, as well as in the case of focus groups, the reasons of those who consider the mechanism of specialized anti-corruption lines to be ineffective are that *"Citizens do not know about this mechanism... they do not trust/are afraid. The system is not secure/does not ensure confidentiality. The person is not sure of the finality of the examination of the complaint."* And as necessary measures to be taken they mentioned *"Informing the population. Ensuring the confidentiality of individuals and ensuring the finality of the examination of the complaint"*.

d. Analysis of the application efficiency of specialized anti-corruption lines by public authorities

In the process of analyzing and evaluating the application of institutional mechanisms and the effectiveness of public authorities' intervention in the process of examining complaints/notifications on corruption, the necessary indicators were collected from the responsible institution for managing the mechanism:

- Bookeeping of a calls record for the national/specialized anti-corruption line;
- The number of criminal cases initiated based on the calls to the national/specialized anti-corruption lines.

Regarding the subject of calls to the National Anticorruption Line and the connection with corruption manifestations, we can see that only 5% made complaints about corruption manifestations.




Figure 27: Evolution of the number of corruption manifestations denunciations, of criminal cases initiated and of persons arrested in flagrante delicto based on the calls registered during the years 2018-2022 (quarter I) to the national anti-corruption line

In terms of criminal cases initiated based on the complaints to the NAL, the data show a very large gap. For example in 2019, out of 227 complaints, only 2 criminal cases were initiated. In 2020, only 2,3% of the registered denunciations served as grounds for initiating criminal prosecution. A single criminal case based on complaints to the NAL was initiated in 2021. In 2022, the data shows a better share of criminal cases initiated based on the denunciations received at the NAL, so that out of 10 denunciations, the NAC initiated 3 criminal cases, which shows a 30% efficiency and has arrested in flagrante delicto 6 persons – which is a news. The data regarding the persons arrested based on the calls to the NAL in the period 2018-2021, could not be presented by NAC, because it did not keep such records.

The public entities questioned regarding the specialized anti-corruption line confirmed the presence of the call register in the share of approximately 42%. More than half do not have a record book. Thus, it is found that the authorities that established the specialized anti-corruption line do not necessarily have a call register, which would maintain the statistics and data on the evolution of the calls received.




Figure 28: Share of authorities that have created registers to record calls to the specialized anti-corruption line.

Moreover, a large number of the entities that established a call record register, did not adapt the content of the register to the requirements provided by the Regulation, limiting themselves only to the model register for the record of calls to the National Anticorruption Line.

In the figure below, the degree of use of the specialized anti-corruption lines is illustrated, but also the number of calls that do not meet the competence of the specialized line and therefore indicates the level of understanding by citizens of the usefulness and destination of the mechanism, as well as the way how the public entities apply it this tool (internal review or redirection to other entities).




Figure 29: Share of calls that were received and examined within the entity, of those redirected to other authorities and of those that are not in the competence of the specialized anti-corruption line.

In 2018, out of the total of 2 042 registered calls, about 28% contain information regarding acts of corrupt behavior that may constitute disciplinary violations examined by the entity that received the call, 9% were redirected to other entities, and another 63% are calls which mostly concerned requests for information or consultations.

In 2019, 1 423 calls were registered, of which 23% contain information on acts of corrupt behavior that may constitute disciplinary violations and were examined within the entity, about

12% were redirected to other entities, and another 65% did not relate to acts of corrupt behavior.

The share of calls containing information on acts of corrupt behavior that may constitute disciplinary violations in 2020 out of a total of 1 530 is about 38,5%, including 5% redirected to other entities, compared to 61,5% of calls that mostly concerned information requests.

In 2021, the public entities recorded 1 603 calls to the specialized lines, of which approximately 19% refer to acts of corrupt behavior that may constitute disciplinary violations examined within the entity, 7,5% were redirected to other entities, and 73,5% did not contain such information. In 2021, the GPI forwarded to the NAL 2 calls that referred to the involvement of its employees in corruption acts.

For the first quarter of 2022, the surveyed entities indicated that only 52 calls out of 1020 contain information on acts of corrupt behavior that may constitute disciplinary violations.




Figure 30: Evolution of the number of calls recorded during the period 2018-2022 (quarter I) to the specialized anti-corruption line that refer to and do not refer to manifestations of corruption

Unfortunately, the public entities did not track the fate of the forwarded calls to confirm to which authority they were forwarded and how their examination has finalised. In this context, most of the entities did not present data regarding this aspect, with the exception of MIA which confirmed the initiation of **61 criminal cases** based on calls to the specialized anti-corruption line and the GPI which redirected 2 calls to the NAL in 2021. Shall be mentioned that the MIA has a criminal prosecution body and an anti-corruption subdivision.




Figure 31: The evolution of the number of criminal cases initiated in the period 2018-2022 (quarter I) based on calls to the specialized anti-corruption line of the MIA, managed by the Service for Internal Protection and Anticorruption (SIPA)

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	2	There is a regulatory framework that regulates the application of the specialized/national anti-corruption hotline mechanism, which is of a suitable quality
Analysis and evaluation of the level of use of the specialized/national anti-corruption hotline mechanism by citizens	1	The anti-corruption hotline mechanism is used frequently and routinely, without access difficulties, but there is still room for improvement in terms of citizens' understanding of the purpose and usefulness of the anti-corruption hotlines
	2	The mechanism of the National Anti-corruption Line is applied consistently and routinely, having established an institutional mechanism for examining corruption denunciations
Analysis and evaluation of the level of institutional application of the specialized/national anti-corruption hotline mechanism by the authorities,	1	The mechanism of specialized anti-corruption lines is institutionalized and partially applied, and only some authorities (NAC and MIA) consistently follow the issuance of decisions/solutions/sanctions on the reported cases
	2	The mechanism of the National Anti-corruption Line is applied consistently and routinely, having established an institutional mechanism for examining corruption denunciations

III.6. INFORMATION LINES

The institutional information lines were launched in 2013, alongside with the national anti-corruption line and the specialized anti-corruption lines, and their basic purpose is to ensure the transparency of the public entity and provide all information about its activity. Having included the information lines in the anti-corruption hotline system is intended to provide legal guarantees for ensuring the transparency of public authorities and unhindered access to information of public interest.

a. Regulation

The normative framework	Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013 for the approval of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption hotline system
Beneficiaries/users	Any natural or legal person
Scope (public/private/general)	General scope, as it can be used by all interested persons. Information lines facilitate interaction with civil society, public agents from other entities, representatives of the private sector, etc.
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>Institutional lines for information are established at the level of each authority of the specialized central public administration and, as the case may be, of the subordinate authorities, at the level of each autonomous administrative authority and at the level of each authority of the local public administration.</p> <p>The information lines can be accessed by phone by calling the number indicated on the official web page of the public entity.</p> <p>Calls are answered by the operator or robot.</p> <p>If the call contains information about a corruption act, the operator immediately redirects the call to the national anti-corruption line, and if the call contains information about the involvement of an employee of the called public entity in corruption acts, it is recorded in a special register.</p>

b. Analysis and evaluation of the normative framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	The regulation for the operation of the anti-corruption hotline system, approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013, defines the mechanism for the establishment and operation of the institutional information lines.
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones	The regulation approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013 is directly applicable at the level of all public entities . In addition to this, it is necessary to approve the call record register and designate the person or subdivision responsible for management, which can be done through an internal act (decision/order of the manager).

The quality of the subordinate normative framework	<p>The normative framework does not require additional regulations to those approved by Law no. 252 of 25.10.2013.</p> <p>Public authorities by an order or manager's decision approve the call register, designate the responsible person and telephone number.</p> <p>In the case of the surveyed entities, no other regulations were detected that would exceed the limits established in the Framework Regulation.</p>
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	<p>The rules of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption hotline system correspond to the statutory principles of the UN Convention against Corruption and the instruments of the GRECO Group of States against Corruption.</p> <p>Likewise, the provisions of the Regulation correspond to the purpose of the Integrity Law no. 82/2017.</p>
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	<p>In general, the existing normative framework has a clear character and does not contain ambiguous wording and there are no conflicts of legal norms.</p> <p>A vulnerability of these regulations consists in the lack of provisions aimed at controlling the application of Law no. 252/2013, for which reason at the moment 23% of the authorities surveyed have not implemented this mechanism.</p>

c. Analysis and evaluation of the Information Lines level of use by citizens

Institutional information lines are of particular importance in the citizen's interaction with public entities and represent a basic tool for ensuring institutional transparency. A good part of the surveyed entities confirmed the presence of institutional information lines and only 23% communicated that they do not have such a mechanism.

Generalizing the collected data, we find that the institutional information lines are intensively used, so that in the period 2018-2022, approximately 1,301,094 calls were registered.




Figure 34: The evolution of the number of calls registered during the years 2018-2022 (quarter I) to the information lines

The values presented above indicate an increasing dynamic in the number of calls received by public institutions that have institutional information lines. Thus, in 2021 practically the total number of calls is 130% higher than it was in 2018.




Figure 35: Evolution of the number of calls registered to the information lines of the National Office of Social Insurance, Central Electoral Commission, Agency for Intellectual Property, National Office of Medical Insurance, Public Service Agency and other entities during the years 2018-2022 (quarter I).

Following the analysis of the calls, it has been found that the majority of the calls were registered by the PSA, about 68% of the total number, this fact is due to the wide range of public services that are also the most requested, and the increase in the official statistics is also explained by the institutionalization of some procedures for managing calls to the PSA information line. Another 19% of the total number of registered calls were received by NOSI and 9% by NOMI. The other entities received about 4% of the total number of calls, or about 50 000 calls.

d. Analysis of the application efficiency of the institutional information lines by public authorities

As a result of the survey of public entities, 77% communicated that they have an institutional information line.




Figure 36: Share of authorities that have created mechanisms to manage calls to the information line, have designated a responsible person and/or established call registers

Out of the total number of institutions that have a call management mechanism, approximately 62% did not establish a call record register and did not appoint a person responsible for managing calls to the information line, approximately 67% of entities confirm that they have appointed a responsible person.




Figure 37: Evolution of the number of calls recorded during the period 2018-2022 (quarter I) to the information line that were examined within the entity or were forwarded to other authorities

It has been found that almost all the calls from the information lines are examined within the entities, and only a small number are redirected to other entities. This fact indicates on a good understanding by citizens of the purpose of the information line. However, as a result of applying the method of the mysterious petitioner, multiple problems were revealed in the operation of the information lines, which confirm the existence of systemic deficiencies in the management of these lines: the information provided is incomplete, there are often contradictions between what is communicated over the phone and the documents requested at the counter, although the posters from the offices of the authorities they communicate about e-services (e-NOMI: slogan "No papers and time lost for submitting the form"), at the counter even scanned documents and submitted electronically are not accepted, but printed copies are requested (in the case of NOMI) .

Another institutional problem related to the management of the information lines that was revealed while questioning the authorities, was the presence of qualified personnel: "Specialized training is needed for the people who receive the calls to the Information Line: to be psychologically prepared, to know how to build the discussion with the caller, to know what exactly what recommendation to provide, to know what actions are needed after finishing the discussion."

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	2	There is a normative framework that regulates the application of the complaint mechanism, which is of a suitable quality.
Analysis and evaluation of the level of use of the mechanism of information lines by citizens	2	The mechanism is used frequently and usually, without access difficulties, being an important source of information for citizens who request the authority's support
Analysis and evaluation of the level of institutional application of the mechanism of information lines by the authorities	1	The mechanism is institutionalized and partially applied. Only some authorities keep records of calls and beneficiary satisfaction

III.7. OTHER INFORMAL MECHANISMS (RELAWED)

Feedback platforms are special sections of the web pages of public authorities, especially dedicated to users who wish to intervene either with proposals or with complaints regarding certain actions or inactions of the authorities. The analysis carried out by the authors of this report shows that some authorities have integrated this section on their official web pages. Often these are not managed in a prompt manner or are even non-functional.

The section below provides a case study on the operation of a feedback platform, developed by NAC, to provide the public with a tool for reporting corruption risks contained in the normative acts that are applied/in force.

reLAWed

Law no. 100 of 22.12.2017 on normative acts establishes in an exhaustive manner the stages of drafting normative acts, which are to be underwent, so that any adopted normative act corresponds to the principles of the legislative activity. However, going through all these stages does not exclude the possibility of admitting some provisions, which could generate risks of corruption in the process of the effective application of the normative act. In 2020, the United Nations Development Program in Moldova, in partnership with the National Anticorruption Centre, developed the [reLAWed application](#), which aims to provide people with the opportunity to get involved in the process of improving the legal framework, take a stand, identify and notify/communicate about normative acts with deficiencies, gaps, interpretable or which, when applied, have generated/may generate corruption manifestations, abuses or other illegalities.

a. Regulation

The normative framework	This mechanism for reporting the risks of corruption from the normative acts in force is not expressly provided by the regulatory rules, but it respects the rules of the corruption proofing activity carried out by the National Anti-Corruption Centre, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 1104 of 06.06.2002 on the NAC and Integrity Law no. 82 of 25.05.2017.
Beneficiaries/users	Any natural or legal person
Scope (public/private/general)	General scope, as it can be used by all interested persons, civil society, the business environment, etc.
Grievance / complaint methods	<p>The platform can be accessed online from a computer or mobile device, through the official website of NAC www.cna.md or from the address http://relawed.cna.md/. At the same time, reports can also be made anonymously, without the disclosure of data that would lead to the identification of the person.</p> <p>The platform offers users the opportunity to describe the problematic norm; to propose changes regarding the reported normative act; to follow the stage of examination of the notification.</p> <p>The platform also contains reporting statistics.</p>

b. Analysis and evaluation of the normative framework

The quality of the higher normative framework	This mechanism for reporting corruption risks from the normative acts in force is not expressly provided by the current normative framework.
The level of development of the normative framework through subordinate normative acts, including departmental ones	The operating procedure of the "reLAWed" Information System is regulated by the internal normative act of the National Anticorruption Centre.
The quality of the subordinate normative framework	The quality of the subordinate normative framework cannot be assessed, as this is an internal act.
The level of compliance with the regulatory framework	The level of compliance of the normative framework with the provisions of international standards in the field cannot be assessed.
Vulnerability factors of legal norms	Since the departmental act regarding the application of this mechanism is not public, the vulnerability of it or of the enforcement control mechanisms cannot be assessed.

c. Analysis and evaluation of the level of use of mechanism X by citizens

The reLAWed platform allows the real-time visualization of submitted reports, of the status of their examination, the response provided to the person who submitted the report, the questioning carried out by the NAC to the authority responsible for the policies and regulations in the field of reporting, including the measures taken to resolve each individual report and the answers received from the public entities responsible for applying the provisions of the indicated normative act.

At the same time, the relawed platform can provide accurate information about registered notifications, based on search filters such as the type of normative act; the occupation of the person who notified, the appointed expert responsible for the registered notification, as well as the status of its examination).




Figure 38: The categories of actors who filed notifications on the relawed platform during the years 2020-2022 (semester I)

The public is informed about the Relawed platform during the trainings and information activities of the target groups, including in the advisory support offered to public entities for the implementation of integrity standards, as well as in awareness raising campaigns on social networks.

d. Analysis and efficiency of the application of mechanism relawed by public authorities

The mechanism for examining notifications submitted within reLAWed is regulated by an internal normative act of the NAC. Thus, the Instruction regarding the operation of the "reLAWed" Information System, which regulates the procedure for receiving and examining reports received from the society, establishes that the subdivision responsible for examining the reports registered in the "reLAWed" Information System is the Centre's Anti-corruption Legislation and Expertise Directorate.




Figure 39: The evolution of the number of notifications on the relawed platform during the years 2020-2022 (quarter I) that were received and examined

ReLAWed is a digital mechanism designed to digitize the authority-citizen interaction. In the completed questionnaire, NAC mentioned that "The importance of knowing both the areas and institutional activities vulnerable to corruption acts or acts lack of integrity, as well as the normative acts that can generate corruption risks, relies in the fact that the necessary premises are created to restore the previous situation by determining and implementing appropriate measures, including by modifying the legal framework. The identification of processes susceptible to corruption offers the possibility for public entities to take the necessary measures to restore the institutional balance or to forward the identified irregularities to the higher hierarchical level or to the competent institutions for solving them, including the promotion and approval/adoption of normative acts".

e. Evaluation grid (assigned scores)

Analysis and evaluation of the regulatory framework	0	There is no normative framework that would regulate how to apply the reporting mechanism
Analysis and assessment of the level of use of the reLAWed mechanism by citizens	1	The mechanism is partially used
Analysis and assessment of the level of institutional application of the reLAWed mechanism by the authorities	2	The mechanism is applied consistently and routinely, with the issuance of solutions for each case, including the involvement of other decision-makers.

IV. RANKING OF CORRUPTION REPORTING MECHANISMS

Based on the findings for each complaint mechanism, were assigned scores (on a scale of 0 to 2) to each dimension. The overall score per mechanism was calculated by summing the assigned scores to each dimension. As a result of assigning the scores, the following evaluation grid was generated, which reveals the level of development of the higher and departmental normative framework regarding the complaint mechanism, the level of use by citizens, but also the level of application of the institutional mechanisms for examining complaints about corruption:

The score of the analyzed mechanism	Mechanism evaluation grid				
		The normative framework	Level of use of the complaint mechanisms by citizens	Level of application of the institutional mechanisms for examining corruption complaints/reports	TOTAL
	COMPLAINT/DENOUNCE/SELF-DENOUNCE	2	2	1	5
	PETITION	1	1	1	3
	WHISTLEBLOWING DISCLOSURE	1	1	1	3
	UNDUE INFLUENCES REPORTING	2	1	1	4
	SPECIALIZED ANTI-CORRUPTION LINES	2	1	1	4
	NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LINE	2	1	2	5
	INFORMATION LINES	2	1	1	4
OTHER INFORMAL MECHANISMS (RELAWE)	0	1	2	3	

From the presented grid, we can conclude that 3 mechanisms require improvements in the **regulatory framework**:

- Petition;
- Whistleblowing disclosure,
- Relawed platform.

Excepting the complaint, denunciation and self-denunciation, all mechanisms are **used satisfactorily by citizens**, and the authorities need to carry out more actions to inform and encourage corruption complaints/reporting.

The internal examination procedures applied within the institutions needs improvement for the examination of corruption complaints received through the mechanisms of:

- Complaint/ denunciation/ self-denunciation,
- Petition,
- Whistleblowing disclosure,
- Undue influences reporting,
- Specialized anti-corruption lines,
- Information lines,
- Relawed platform.

In order to remedy the identified deficiencies, the following chapter presents the findings and recommendations for improving the efficiency of the corruption complaint mechanisms.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The respective chapter includes the findings and basic conclusions of the analysis of the effectiveness of the corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector in the Republic of Moldova. The chapter is divided into 2 sections: conclusions and recommendations, which are divided into blocks according to the complaint mechanisms analyzed.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Regarding the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism:

The complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation are formal mechanisms for notifying the public authorities about a crime, regulated by the CPC and MC, which are developed through a series of subordinate normative acts. They meet to the requirements of the regulatory limits and respect the deadlines imposed by the CPC and MC.

CPC and MC, in the part related to "Notification of the criminal investigation body" (Chapter II, Title I, Special Part, CPC) and "Declaration of the misdemeanor" (Chapter VI, Title II, Special Part, MC), as well as the documents norms that develop them, in general, are in accordance with the criteria of clarity and predictability, having a concise and comprehensive character.

During the last 5 years, a total number of 2 691 complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes or misdemeanors were submitted to the legal bodies of the Republic of Moldova, of which 1 874 were from individuals and 807 from legal entities.

Most complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations were filed at the NAC - 1 848, APO - 454 and GPI - 379.

The pandemic had a certain effect on the way citizens understood to use the classic mechanisms of notifying public authorities about the commission of a crime/corruption offense. Thus, the number of complaints decreased insignificantly in 2019-2020. However, in 2020 there is an "unusual" increase in the number of complaints and denunciations regarding corruption crimes addressed to the GPI: 63 complaints in relation to 56 addressed to the NAC and 34 to the APO, and 108 denunciations made by legal persons. This is most likely explained by the proximity of GPI subdivisions to citizens, given that, during the pandemic, the mobility was reduced.

The number of self-denunciations increased significantly, from 96 in 2018 to 177 in 2020 and 182 in 2021.

We must note that most self-denunciations about corruption crimes were made by legal entities, and the most "requested" institution through this mechanism was the NAC. Without a detailed study of the typology of these self-denunciations, it is difficult to explain this "unusual" and significant increase in the degree of "civic responsibility among legal entities" during the pandemic.

During the period 2018 – the first quarter of 2022, no complaint, denunciation or self-denunciation was submitted regarding the following:

- **crimes:** violation of the confidentiality regime of information from wealth and personal interests declarations of (art. 330¹ Criminal Code) and embezzlement of funds from external funds (art. 332² Criminal Code)
- **misdemeanors:** violation of the legal regime of incompatibilities and limitations applicable to public office or office of public dignity (art. 313⁴ CC), failure to take measures

regarding the execution of the provisions of the Law on the declaration of wealth and personal interests (art. 313⁵ CC); violation of the legal regime of restrictions and limitations related to the termination of the mandate, employment or service relationships and the migration to the private sector of public agents (revolving doors) (art. 313⁶ MC); concealing a corruption act or an act related to it or not taking strict measures (art. 314 MC); violation of the rules for declaring wealth and personal interests (art. 330² MC).

Within the NAC, the majority of the complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations referred to the following:

- **crimes:** influence peddling (art. 326 CC) – 520; passive corruption (art. 324 CC) – 312 and abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 272;
- **misdemeanors:** excess of power or excess of official authority (art. 313 MC) – 135 and abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 312 MC) – 41.

As far as the APO is concerned, most of the complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations referred to the following:

- **crimes:** abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 150; passive corruption (art. 324 CC) – 89 and excess of power or excess of official authority (art. 328 CC) – 83.
- **misdemeanors:** excess of power or exceeding the duties of office (art. 313 MC) – 12 and abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 312 MC) – 9.

Within the GPI, the majority of the complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations referred to the following crimes: forgery in public documents (art. 332 CC) – 169 and abuse of power or abuse of official position (art. 327 CC) – 124.

Considering the findings described above, the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism is used frequently and customary, without access difficulties, both by individuals and legal entities.

The efficiency of the application of the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism by the competent public authorities (APO, NAC, GPI) was measured by comparing the total number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations addressed to the public authorities with the total number of criminal cases initiated.

In the period from 2018 to the first quarter of 2022, in total, 2 988 criminal cases were initiated, 1 073 corruption cases were submitted for examination in court and in the case of 176 corruption cases, a criminal sentence was issued.

At the same time, in the focus group it was mentioned that the denunciation/self-denunciation is often used to solve personal problems and/or is a tool through which the representatives of the law bodies use for enrichment. A separate problem is the hyper-criminalization of the criminal law system, the abusive behavior of law enforcement representatives and their impunity.

Taking into account the fact that the total number of criminal corruption cases, initiated in the last 5 years, by APO, NAC and GPI is higher than the number of complaints/denunciations/self-denunciations regarding corruption crimes, submitted by natural persons/legal entities to these authorities, we conclude that the mechanism is usually applied, with the issuance of decisions/solutions/sanctions. However, there are integrity issues at the level of application of the mechanism, which are generated, most often, by the abusive behavior of the representatives of law enforcement bodies and their impunity.

B. Regarding the petition mechanism

The petition (notification, request, proposal) is one of the classic mechanisms of the citizens' interaction with public authorities, which is regulated by Administrative Code no. 116 of 19.07.2018, having consistent provisions with the criteria of clarity and predictability, concise and comprehensive character, being timely and applicable. Unfortunately, the subordinated regulatory framework for implementing the Administrative Code is underdeveloped.

The analysis and evaluation of the level of use of the petition mechanism by citizens, including through the public authorities survey, allowed to conclude the following:

- Public authorities have a low degree of openness for providing information, which is not consistent with Law no. 982-XIV of 11.05.2000 on access to information. Out of 145 public authorities, to whom the questionnaire was sent, less than 1/3 (47) responded. We assume that the same "degree of openness" is also manifested when the authorities "examine and respond" to notifications, requests and proposals, coming from individuals and legal entities. In this context, the logical question arises, how interested are the public authorities in receiving feedback from citizens regarding the quality of the offered services.

- In majority of the public authorities that responded to the questionnaire, there are boxes for collecting petitions and/or a functional online tool for petitions. These two additional opportunities complement the basic way of notifying the public authorities – by post.

- During 5 years, the public authorities received, in total, 240 730 petitions. Although it seems an impressive total, we still have to draw attention to the fact that annually, on average, 9-10 CPAs and 3 LPAs, of those who answered the questionnaire, do not receive any petitions. The non-receiving by the public authority of any notifications, requests or proposals from the citizens should constitute: an indication of the "reason for existence" of any authority; an indication of the degree of citizens' trust in the respective public authority or, possibly, an indication of the quality of the authority's activity. In any case, the State Chancellery should analyze the efficiency of the activity of these authorities and provide the assessments regarding the reasons for not receiving any notifications, requests or proposals by a public authority during a year.

- The focus group discussed the quality, professionalism and integrity of civil servants, which, according to the interviewees, has degraded from one government to another. The majority of governments did not ensure the separation of the political level from the administrative level in the public authorities, people from the governing party were promoted to the positions of heads of subdivisions in the public authorities, having eliminated "institutional memory" or impossible to develop it as such. At the same time, the appointment of people from the ruling party to the positions of heads of subdivisions, deputies or specialists in the public authority distorts the mentality of civil servants: they do not realize that they are paid from citizens' taxes, that they must act for and in the interest of citizens. In fact, they promote the interests of the party and the politicians, who appointed them, and they are sure that political protection will protect them from possible liability for illegalities committed during the exercise of their public office.

- Over the 5 years, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova addressed a total of 3 665 petitions regarding corruption issues to the central public authorities and none to the local public authorities. Most of the petitions regarding the topics of corruption were addressed to the National Integrity Authority, law enforcement bodies (National Administration of Penitentiaries, Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Police Inspectorate) and the Central Electoral Commission (voters' corruption).

- In general, public authorities (with the exception of NIA, NAP, MIA, GPI and CEC) do not keep separate records of petitions on corruption issues. The lack of mechanisms for registration and control of petitions on corruption issues is worrying, especially in the case of institutions, which by the nature of their powers, should have been concerned with the integrity of the system they administer (for example, SCP) and in the case of the institutions that ensure the implementation of government policies in the sectors that, according to surveys, are affected by corruption (for example, the Ministry of Health).

- At the same time, the lack of mechanisms for registration and control of petitions regarding corruption topics is also suggestive in the context of the analysis of the engagement degree of public authorities in the implementation of public anti-corruption policy documents. Until now, the Republic of Moldova has implemented 3 national anti-corruption strategies, which contained activities, for which the progress indicator, among others, was the number of corruption complaints/reports. In this context, it is not clear how the public authorities reported the accomplishment of the activities, if there was no mechanism for registration and control of petitions on corruption subjects. And if the mechanism existed, it is not clear why it no longer exists now, in the context where corruption continues to be a problem for the Republic of Moldova.

- Analyzing the total number of petitions regarding corruption issues, registered in the CPA and the number of petitions regarding corruption issues solved (3 281), in the process of resolution (2 993) or pending before the courts (1 236), as well as their dynamics, we note that if a petition has been registered, within a foreseeable time it will be examined and a solution offered, which can be appealed, if the petitioner is not satisfied.

C. Regarding whistleblowing disclosures

The analysis of the effectiveness of the whistleblowing disclosures mechanism shows that it is still not fully used and applied in the Republic of Moldova: both by employers and by employees. The regulatory framework in the field was modernized in 2018, but the adoption of subsequent acts was delayed. In the process of analyzing the quality of the normative acts that regulate the field, the presence of competing legal norms between Law 82/2017 and Law 122/2018 on the part related to the potential sanctioning of whistleblowers was detected. At the same time, it was considered the need for the rules to be applied with caution, good faith and correctly, in order not to harm the efficiency of the mechanism.

Essentially, the main problems of the effectiveness of the whistleblowing mechanism boil down to the understanding, interpretation and application of the rules, in particular:

- adoption of internal rules and procedures regarding the record system and examination of whistleblowing disclosures;
- ensuring the safe (secure) internal system that guarantees the confidentiality of potential whistleblowers and minimizes possible retaliatory actions;
- appointing credible persons (with impeccable reputation) responsible for recording and reviewing whistleblowing disclosures;
- efficient and prompt review of whistleblowing disclosures with subsequent notification of whistleblowers.

Also, some systemic problems in the effective operation of the whistleblowing mechanism were identified, namely:

- lack of an umbrella-institution to monitor and guide public entities and agents in the application of the mechanism. Even if some of these activities are ensured by the NAC and the Ombudsperson's Office through the institutional integrity assessments, the trainings carried

out, however, they are not exercised in a consistent and permanent manner. Moreover, there is no authority to collect and analyze in real time data on the application of the mechanism (application practices): internal systems created, designated persons, disclosures recorded/reviewed; protective measures applied and their categories, etc. ;

- the continued lack of knowledge by public sector exponents, employees of the mechanism of whistleblowing, despite the trainings and information campaigns carried out;
- the formal approach of the entities in the implementation of the mechanism, including by providing incorrect or inconsistent data: internal system created without a register of whistleblowers; the existence of regulations regarding whistleblowers that have not been adjusted to the rules of the new Law 122/2018, etc.;
- the very fragile safeguards compared to the effects of retaliation on employees and the complexity of subsequent legal proceedings, complemented by the judges' lack of knowledge of the substance of the whistleblowing mechanism;
- almost non-existent or questionable judicial practice in the case of the first whistleblower registered by the Ombudsperson's Office, the circumstances of the case not being examined through the lens of whistleblower status, etc.;
- the difficulty of changing the mentality in society regarding the tolerance of corruption manifestations and their non-denunciation, including the lack of incentives for those who report;
- the lack of action algorithms in the case of whistleblowing disclosures: who reports, who examines, etc.

D. Regarding the undue influences reporting

The regulatory framework for reporting undue influence is of a suitable quality and allows users to make use of the tools provided by both the framework laws and the subsequent rules, including the internal acts of public authorities.

However, the use of this complaint mechanism by public agents is not a common practice, which is generated by the following causes:

- lack of knowledge about the obligation to report undue influences;
- lack of knowledge if the internal system for reporting undue influences is created within the entity:
- reluctance about the finality of examining the undue influence complaint;
- fear to whistleblow and lack of confidence in the security of the system.

The respective problems are also valid in the case of the public authorities' responses, which also mentioned the reluctance of public agents. However, the main "incentive" for declaring undue influences seems to be the nature of obligation and the occurrence of disciplinary liability for non-reporting, an approach that must be maintained.

The national regulatory framework expressly provides for the procedure for managing anti-corruption hotlines, but it is not adapted and institutionalized sufficiently and efficiently by all public authorities.

E. Regarding the specialized anti-corruption lines and the national anti-corruption line

- The verification of public authorities' compliance with the provisions of the Regulation on the operation of anti-corruption telephone lines (Law 252/2013) has not been

carried out since its adoption, a fact which has created interpretations at the level of public authorities. There are cases when, although the authority does not have an internal security subdivision, which is a mandatory precondition for the creation of specialized anti-corruption hotlines, the authority has established such a line. These cases raise big questions regarding the efficiency and finality of the examination of the reported facts, as well as the remedying of the situation or disciplinary sanctions within the institution.

- The popularity of the National Anti-corruption Line decreased by 10% between 2017-2021, compared to the specialized anti-corruption lines which were chosen by 5% more respondents than in 2017. Hotlines were the only denunciation option that registered increases in 2021 compared to 2017. The sociological study on the impact of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2023 finds that: "Approximately every fourth respondent from both categories would report directly to the hotline of the institution where a bribe was requested, and each the fifth would report directly to anti-corruption agencies. Mass media, the NAC website and special mobile phone applications remain less popular methods of reporting."

- The questioned authorities indicated that "Citizens do not trust the finality of the examination of the reported violation and are afraid of the consequences of reporting in case of non-assurance of confidentiality, at the same time, citizens do not know enough information about this mechanism and confuse it with the information line."

- Although the authorities rated the anti-corruption hotline mechanism as effective while completing the questionnaires, most do not record calls, cannot provide proven information on their effectiveness and do not ensure an independent and confidential examination of the reporting, which may lead to some reprisals and impairment of constitutional rights of the reporting persons.

- During the focus group, it was revealed that the main expectation of citizens as a result of reporting a case of corruption/illegalities to the anti-corruption hotlines are the disciplinary sanctions, followed by release from the position held or the prohibition to occupy a certain position, reinstatement and/or compensating the damage on the complaining person and only lastly, if the court determines, the application of the penalty of liberty deprivation.

- At the same time, there are areas in which the contact of citizens and service beneficiaries with public agencies is very frequent (education, medicine, etc.), and these are exactly the areas where there are no specialized anti-corruption lines, internal security/control structures, compliance is not ensured and no sanctions are applied for violations that constitute disciplinary misconduct.

F. Regarding information lines

- Although the number of calls in the period 2018-2021, is relatively high, about 1,5 million, it still does not indicate a good functioning of the mechanism, because the statistics presented by the authorities also include appointments, specialized consultations, etc.

- The activity of operators and persons responsible for the management of information lines is not monitored and/or subject to quality control. The information is often incomplete or even erroneous (e.g. NOMI) and the public agent who received the call and should have handled the situation correctly is not sanctioned. The people who suffer the most are those from the vulnerable categories, the elderly, with disabilities, etc.

F. Regarding other informal mechanisms (relawed)

- The specialists in the field, consulted during the focus groups, welcomed the NAC initiative to identify the corruption risks existing in the normative acts in force and qualified the tool as being of good quality in terms of accessibility and transparency.
- The activity of the Relawed platform is not regulated by the higher normative framework, a fact that can generate difficulties in the process of compliance of the authorities with the registered complaints and their offering of formal answers, which do not improve the notified situation.

Recommendations

The authors of this Study put forward the following recommendations for the efficiency of corruption complaint mechanisms in the public sector.

A. Regarding the complaint/denunciation/self-denunciation mechanism:

- Ensure effective implementation of the automated information system "*Criminal prosecution: E-file*", with special attention being paid to the assignment of a unique number for each criminal file, which is under the management of the legal bodies of the Republic of Moldova and which must be maintained regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution or judicial examination.
- Carrying out an extensive study on the facts that could be decriminalized, based on the social danger of the facts, the damage caused, the appropriateness of the expenses borne by the state for the criminal investigation, the trial and the execution of the sentence, the application practice of the respective norms of the Criminal Code, the corruption level of the entire process of incrimination of the respective facts, etc. Elaboration of legislative proposals to amend the normative framework.
- The effective implementation of the legal and institutional mechanisms for holding accountable the representatives of law enforcement agencies for the quality of criminal prosecution, non-compliance with the legislation etc., within each investigated file.
- Eliminating the prescription of criminal liability (art. 60 of the Criminal Code) for crimes against justice (art. 303-323 of the Criminal Code).

B. Regarding the petition mechanism

- Development of the subordinated normative framework for the effective implementation of the Administrative Code.
- Carrying out periodic checks, at least once a year, regarding the application of the Administrative Code and, in particular, the examination of petitions by public authorities.
- Ensuring the separation of the political level from the administrative level of the employees of public authorities, including by not admitting the dismissal/employment from/in the public service of civil servants based on the political criteria.
- Raise accountability of civil servants for their activity and strengthening their professional capacities.

C. Regarding whistleblowing

- Identification of an umbrella institution that would monitor the implementation process of the whistleblowing mechanism, including by creating a specially dedicated record system;
- Identifying and promoting whistleblowing good practices (positive examples), to encourage potential whistleblowers to disclose illegal practices within the entity;
- Continuation of training processes and information campaigns on whistleblowers;
- Re-examining the magnitude and extent of protection measures for whistleblowers, including the possibility of applying protection measures through a binding court order, compared to OAP recommendations, which are often ignored by employers;
- Examining the opportunity to offer financial incentives, if the whistleblowing is related to quantifiable illegal practices (in the banking, fiscal, financial, sectors etc.).

D. Regarding undue influences reporting

- Examining the opportunity to create a permanent control mechanism on the development and application of the internal reporting system of undue influences;
- Informing people upon employment about the obligation to report undue influences and the existence of the internal system (designated responsible person, existence of the register, etc.)
- Carrying out periodic training, especially for new employees regarding the mechanism for reporting undue influences;
- Creating and maintaining online platforms for whistleblowing, especially in entities with a large number of employees or with special status.

E. Regarding the specialized lines and the national anti-corruption line

- Although it is an accessible mechanism, both the questionnaires, the focus groups, and the analysis of sociological studies revealed that it is necessary:
 - to further inform the population;
 - ensure confidentiality of individuals,
 - ensuring the finality of the complaint examination.
- At the systemic level, it is necessary to assess the existence of internal specialized subdivisions (security, control), which, according to the Regulation, must ensure "the receipt of information regarding acts of corrupt behavior by one's own employees, acts that constitute disciplinary violations.". This fact will allow the identification of authorities that abuse the provisions of the regulation or do not ensure the necessary regime of confidentiality and verification of reported violations, with the application of disciplinary sanctions if necessary.
- Liquidation of specialized anti-corruption lines within institutions that do not provide the necessary management conditions and for which these activities are inappropriate.

F. Regarding the information lines

- Assessing the satisfaction degree of service beneficiaries, especially after calling the telephone line, with the adoption of good practices from the private sector, in which the relationship with service beneficiaries is a continuously developing priority.
- Training and appointing qualified personnel as responsible for managing the information line, in order not to provide erroneous information to service beneficiaries and harm their interests.

- The effective implementation of art. 4 of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption telephone line system approved by Law 252/2013, which establishes that "The implementation of the provisions of the Regulation on the operation of the anti-corruption telephone line system and the effective operation of this system are monitored by the National Anti-corruption Centre, which can initiate, within the limits of competence, the necessary checks." and remedying the identified gaps.
- Technical and software endowment for the recording and automated management of calls, the operation of voice messaging, and the storage of the provided information.
- In some cases, it is necessary to establish a single telephone line for each institution to which citizens can call with all the problems they have or the irregularities they want to report.

F. Regarding other informal mechanisms (relawed)

- Increase media coverage and ensure targeted information of lawyers and specialists in the fields about the advantages of the mechanism.
- Raising awareness about the good practices identified as a result of the application of the tool and the successful cases, in order to encourage both the potential rapporteurs and the authorities to fully engage in the process of continuous improvement of the normative framework.

ANNEXES

Annex no. 1. List of surveyed public authorities

MINISTRIES

1.	Ministry of Justice	secretariat@justice.gov.md
2.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration	secdep@mfa.gov.md
3.	Ministry of Interior	secretariat@mai.gov.md
4.	Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development	secretariat@midr.gov.md
5.	Ministry of Labor and Social Protection	secretariat@social.gov.md
6.	Ministry of Health	secretariat@ms.gov.md
7.	Ministry of Economy	secretariat@mei.gov.md
8.	Ministry of Finance	chancellaria@mf.gov.md
9.	Ministry of Defence	chancellaria@army.gov.md
10.	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry	chancellaria@madrm.gov.md
11.	Ministry of the Environment	chancellaria@mediu.gov.md
12.	Ministry of Education and Research	mecc@mecc.gov.md
13.	Ministry of Culture	mc@mc.gov.md

LIST OF AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

1	National Integrity Authority	info@ani.md
2	National Agency for Energy Regulation	anre@anre.md
3	National Agency for the Settlement of Appeals	contestatii@ansc.md
4	National Bank of Moldova	secretariat@bnm.md
5	National Anticorruption Center	secretariat@cna.md
6	National Center for Personal Data Protection	center@datepersonale.md
7	Central Electoral Commission	info@cec.md
8	National Financial Market Commission	office@cnpf.md
9	National Medical Insurance Company	secretariat@cnam.gov.md
10	Audiovisual Council	office@cca.md
11	Competition Council	office@competition.md
12	Court of Accounts	cm@cm.md
13	Ombudsperson's Office	secretariat@ombudsman.md
14	Intelligence and Security Service	sis@sis.md

15	State Protection and Guard Service	secretariat@spps.md
16	Money Laundering Prevention and Combating Service	office@spsb.gov.md
17	Superior Council of Magistracy	aparatul@csm.md
18	Superior Council of Prosecutors	aparat@csp.md

LIST OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

1	Investment Agency	office@invest.gov.md
2	Agency for Medicines and Medical Devices	office@amdm.gov.md
3	National Anti-Doping Agency	officeagency@anad.gov.md
4	National Agency for Research and Development	info@ancd.gov.md
5	National Agency for Food Safety	info@ansa.gov.md
6	Public Property Agency	office@app.gov.md
7	Agency for Land Relations and Cadastre	info@arfc.gov.md
8	Interethnic Relations Agency	secretariat@ari.gov.md
9	Public Services Agency	asp@asp.gov.md
10	State Agency for Intellectual Property	office@agepi.gov.md
11	National Office of Social Insurance	secretariat@cnas.gov.md

LIST OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUBORDINATED TO THE MINISTRIES

1	National Administration of Penitentiaries	anp@anp.gov.md
2	Public Procurement Agency	bap@tender.gov.md
3	Court Administration Agency	aaij@justice.gov.md
4	Moldovan Waters Agency	agentia_am@apele.gov.md
5	Energy Efficiency Agency	office@aee.md
6	Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources	agrm@agrm.gov.md
7	Agricultural Intervention and Payments Agency	aipa@aipa.gov.md
8	Environmental agency	am@am.gov.md
9	Moldsilva Agency	msilva@moldsilva.gov.md
10	National Archives Agency	secretariat@arhiva.gov.md

11	National Agency for Quality Assurance in Education and Research	contact@anacec.md
12	National Social Assistance Agency	info@anas.md
13	National Agency for Curriculum and Assessment	public@ance.gov.md
14	National Agency for Employment	anofm@anofm.md
15	National Agency for the Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activity	agentia.nucleara@anranr.gov.md
16	National Agency for Public Health	office@ansp.gov.md
17	National Auto Transport Agency	secretariat@anta.gov.md
18	Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance	consumator@ACPMS.gov.md
19	Material Reserves Agency	secretariat@rezerve.gov.md
20	Technical Surveillance Agency	secretariat@ast.gov.md
21	Civil Aviation Authority	info@caa.gov.md
22	Migration and Asylum Office	migratie@mai.gov.md
2. 3	National Accreditation Center	secretariat@cna.md
24	General Inspectorate of Carabinieri	igc@igc.gov.md
25	General Inspectorate of Police	igp@igp.gov.md
26	General Inspectorate of Border Police	politia.frontiera@border.gov.md
27	General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations	dse@dse.md
28	Inspectorate for Environmental Protection	medi@ipm.gov.md
29	State Labor Inspectorate	secretariat@im.gov.md
30	Financial Inspection	inspectia.financiara@if.gov.md
31	Social Inspection	office@iss.gov.md
32	State Tax Service	mail@sfs.md
33	Customs Service	vama@customs.gov.md

LIST OF LOCAL COUNCILS AND CITY/MUNICIPALITY HALLS

#	local	Council	Hall
1.	Chisinau	-	primaria@pmc.md
2.	Balti	-	primaria@balti.md

3.	Comrat	-	primaria_comrat@mail.ru
4.	Anenii-Noi	info@anenii-noi.com	primaria.aneni@gmail.com
5.	Basarabească	bascon@mail.ru	primaria.basarabeasca@yandex.ru
6.	Briceni	aplbriceni@rambler.ru	primaria.briceni@inbox.ru
7.	Cahul	secretary@cahul.md	primariacahul@gmail.com
8.	Calarasi	consiliu@calarasi.md	info@calarasi-primaria.md
9.	Cantemir	consiliu@cantemir.md	primaria.cantemir@gmail.com
10.	Causeni	causeni@gmail.com	primaria@causeni.org
11.	Cimișlia	raionul.cimislia@gmail.com	primaria@cimislia.md
12.	Criuleni	consiliu@criuleni.md	criuleniprimaria1@gmail.com
13.	Dondușeni	consiliul@donduseni.md	primariadonduseni@mail.ru
14.	Drochia	cancellordroc@mail.ru	primariaordrochia@gmail.com
15.	Dubasari	consiliudubasari@gmail.com	
16.	Edineț	econsiliu@edinet.md	contact@primariaedinet.md
17.	Fălești	crfalesti@gmail.com	primaria@falesti.md
18.	Florești	info@floresti.md	primariafloresti8@gmail.com
19.	Glodeni	consiliu@glodeni.md	primaria_glodeni@mail.md
20.	Hincești	consiliul@hincesti.md	municipiulhincesti@gmail.com
21.	Ialoveni	ialoveniconsiliu@gmail.com	primaria.ial@gmail.com
22.	Leova	consiliu@leova.md	leovaprimaria@gmail.com
23.	Nisporeni	craional@mail.ru	primarianisporeni@gmail.com
24.	Ocnita	aparat@ocnita.md	primaria.ocnita@mail.ru
25.	Orhei	consiliu.orhei@or.md	primaria@orhei.md
26.	Rezina	contactrezina@mail.ru	primaria-rezina@mail.ru
27.	Rîșcani	inforiscanimd@gmail.com	info@riscani.com
28.	Singerei	consiliu@singerei.md	primaria.singerei@mail.ru
29.	Soldanesti	consiliu@soldanesti.md	soldanesti.primaria@gmail.com
30.	Soroca	crsoroca@gmail.com	msoroca@mtc.md
31.	Stefan-Voda	aparatcsv1@rambler.ru	info@primariastefanvoda.md
32.	Strășeni	consiliulraional@crstraseni.md	primaria.straseni11@gmail.com
33.	Taraclia	anticamera-rs@mail.ru	secretar@taraclia.md
34.	Telenesti	consiliul@telenesti.md	primariatelenesti@gmail.com
35.	Ungheni	consiliul@ungheni.md	anticameraprimaria@gmail.com